



# LAND POWER

A BI-ANNUAL PUBLICATION OF ALLIED LAND COMMAND



## MAGAZINE

FALL 2021

### LEARN

- + Maritime-Land Integration  
In the Baltic Sea Region

### DEVELOP

- + NATO & UNSCR 1325  
Women | Peace | Security

### DISCOVER

- + COM LANDCOM Visits  
Baltics and Ukraine

### BONUS

- + Russian & Chinese Influence  
In Key Strategic Areas



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
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# WELCOME

### Front Cover:

Credit: Eriks Kukutis, Latvian Ministry of Defence

LATVIA – Soldiers of the Land Forces Mechanized Infantry Brigade, Latvian National Guard, Special Operations Command, NATO enhanced Forward Presence Battlegroup Latvia, the Baltic Battalion and the U.S. Special Operations Forces Command in Europe participate in the military exercise "Winter Shield".

### Rear Cover:

Credit: Spanish Army photo by SFC Abel Morales, Allied Land Command (LANDCOM), PAO.

The LANDPOWER magazine is a bi-annual publication produced by Allied Land Command (LANDCOM) dedicated to the promotion of actions and ideas, contributing to the improvement of the NATO Force Structure (NFS) efficiency and effectiveness. The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the LANDCOM Commander, SACEUR, NATO or its member nations and cannot be quoted as an official statement of those entities. An electronic version that includes additional links to in-depth articles, supplementary articles and an ability to provide online comments is available from the LANDCOM website ([www.lc.nato.int](http://www.lc.nato.int)).

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from the

# COMMANDER



***“An organization's ability to learn, and translate that learning into action rapidly, is the ultimate competitive advantage.”***

***- Jack Welch***

When this magazine is published, I will have had the privilege of being the commander of NATO Allied Land Command for a little over a year. Since our spring issue, we've covered a lot of ground in pursuit of readiness and interoperability amongst allies and partners through observing and enhancing training of NATO and partner land forces. And as we build up NATO readiness in the land domain, an emphasis on multi-domain readiness becomes apparent.

In May at Grafenwoehr, Germany, I was the NATO Senior Trainer at U.S. Army exercise Dynamic Front 21, a U.S. Army exercise focused on the interoperability and long range fires capabilities of Allied nations in Europe. Ensuring artillery from different countries can work together meant observing indirect fire missions by crews from Spain, Italy, Germany, Poland, the U.S., and our partner Ukraine which we've had a growing relationship the past six months.

In the spring I made it a point to visit our allies in The Baltics and Poland to deepen my understanding of the regions challenges, and see where LANDCOM can be further integrated, and how battle groups, national forces, and Multi-National Divisions can reach out to each other; building shared capacity to respond to threats together. The face-to-face time proved invaluable in identifying opportunities that weren't readily apparent from a phone call or a slide deck.

Ukraine was also a major focus with a Key Leader Visit in March, and an iteration of Land Staff Talks in July. Ukraine is an important partner on NATO's eastern border, and has been subjected to Russian aggression to the past several years. By spending time with our Ukrainian partners, we were able to learn from their experiences, and share NATO standards to build towards greater comprehensive deterrence.

An Advisory Team met the armed forces of another NATO partner: Serbia. While in Vranje, Serbia, our team conducted training and consultation within the framework of the Operations Capability Concept Evaluation and Feedback (OCC E&F) Program. This helped prepare SAF for potentially upcoming operations as an operational partner.

The return of Steadfast Defender this year provided an opportunity for over 9,000 air, land, maritime and special operations forces from more than 20 Allied and partnered nations to train together; improving multi-domain defensive capabilities. After over a year of reduced and cancelled exercises due to COVID-19, it was good to have large scale, complex, multi-domain exercises back with relevant safety measure in place.

In the multi-domain environment, LANDCOM sent an advisory team to the U.S.-Ukraine naval exercise Sea Breeze 21 to certify trainers so they could evaluate Ukrainian Air Assault Marine Company. The opportunity to contribute to a Maritime exercise open bridges for future engagement and avoid stove piping our involvement in building capabilities throughout NATO land forces.

Aggressive actors transcend multiple domains of warfare. Our deterrence must do the same, and more. Whether our enemies engage via land, sea, air, cyber, or space, we must be able respond swiftly, and have our friends across the domains one call away. **LC**

***For the Soldier!***

**ROGER L. CLOUTIER JR.**  
LANDCOM Commander

from the

# CSEL

# Ground truth



**A**s we head down the road in pursuit of modernization, we must always remember to look in the rearview mirror to be sure we aren't losing track of where we came from. Our own LANDCOM history seems just as applicable today as it did back in 2014 when we declared Full Operational Capacity (FOC) in Izmir.

## "For the Soldier!"

This, the first official motto of Allied Land Command (LANDCOM), was established by its first commander, U.S. Army Lieutenant General Frederick "Ben" Hodges. His emphasis was for every leader in LANDCOM to be imbued with the ethos that all plans, initiatives, key decisions, and actions developed by this headquarters were ultimately for the accomplishment of the mission by the most basic element of any Army unit: The Soldier. A soldier is therefore the lynchpin for the successful execution of any given mission. "For the Soldier!" serves as a reminder to the countries that enjoy the protection of the Alliance's collective defence and collaboration that it is essential to train,

equip, and prepare Soldiers to conduct the missions they are called upon to do. NATO Land Forces, comprised of thousands of multinational soldiers from 30 contributing nations, are spread across the totality of Supreme Allied Commander Europe's (SACEUR) AOR. Each of our contributing nations bring their own standard operating procedures, equipment and expertise to our operations and activities. The job of providing coherence and unity across Land forces is the privileged responsibility of the Commander, Allied Land Command, as directed by SACEUR. In turn, as the Command Sergeant Major representing NATO Land Forces, I am tasked with advising the commander on the state of the soldiers that make up the ground forces assigned to NATO posts, with a particular focus on the NATO Forces Structure (NFS) and partner nation soldiers. A key component to the NFS' effectiveness is the empowerment and professionalism of our Alliance NCOs.

In my opinion, in order to support a maximum level of effort, there is an implied task of acceptance and understanding of each of the domains and country norms which, in turn operationalizes the need for what we call, "Cultural Intelligence or CQ." This means, in order to advocate for change and modernization there is a vital requirement to find the common bonds between all the inherent cultural differences of troops from 30 NATO nations. Qualities like humility and patience are key characteristics that enable leaders to be open to concepts and approaches to problem solving. A humble and open-minded soldier provides for inclusion and respect on the ground, and arguably makes him or

her a formidable weapon in the pursuit of excellence and professionalism. Interoperability does not need us to abandon tradition and or national pride. In fact, that tapestry of talents makes us stronger.

Peter Drauker says "our mission in life should be to make a positive difference, not to prove how right or smart we are." Command Sergeants Major and the CSEL community are asked to make people their mission and, as such, we are expected to lead the institution in culture awareness, and strive for a heightened emotional and cultural intelligence for our subordinate warriors. By understanding and educating each other, we are then able to ensure our force is ready to contribute to the defence and deterrence of the Euro Atlantic.

**For The Soldier!**

LC

**KEVIN J. MATHERS**  
LANDCOM Command Senior Enlisted Leader

LANDCOM CSEL presents the Warrior of the Month award



**MARITIME-LAND INTEGRATION  
NAVAL FORCES (SNF) AND  
PROJECTION (EFP) LAND FORCES**





# **BETWEEN NATO'S STANDING NATO'S ENHANCED FORWARD IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION (BSR)**

*By British Army Lieutenant Colonel J Lee Smart Royal Signals BSc Arch MA PS(J)*



**I**N 2017, NATO established its 'Enhanced Forward Presence' (eFP) consisting of three Multi-National Armoured Battle Groups deployed to bolster the defensive capabilities of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. A fourth such US-led Multi-National Battlegroup was deployed to Poland. These four eFP battle groups exercising near the eastern borders of their respective countries provide visible and persistent evidence to the Baltic States and Poland of NATO's enduring commitment to unified common defence against any potential use of force against their sovereignty. Less evident, but just the horizon, are NATO's Standing Naval Forces (SNF): multinational fleets of destroyers, frigates, corvettes and mine-hunting/mine-sweeping vessels which regularly patrol the Baltic Sea. These Standing Naval Maritime Groups (SNMG) and Mine Countermeasure Groups (SNMCMG) are controlled and directed by NATO's Allied Command Operations (ACO) Maritime Command headquarters, or HQ MARCOM, from the Maritime Operational Control Centre (MOCC), in Northwood, UK. A relatively new entity, MARCOM declared full operational capability on 22 May 2015 and provides ongoing command for the fleets in NATO's deployed Standing Naval Forces, and ongoing NATO maritime security operations, spanning from the Arctic in the High North, to the Atlantic, Mediterranean, Black Sea, and into the Indian Ocean.

With over 400 staff personnel commanded by Vice Admiral Keith Blount CB OBE (GBR Royal Navy), MARCOM is the smallest of NATO's three Single Service Commands. It provides planning, direction and coordination of NATO's substantial maritime assets including aircraft carriers, fighting ships, submarines and maritime patrol aircraft, as well as

NATO's Amphibious Forces capabilities. In addition to its direct command of the SNF and any NATO Response Forces, MARCOM is the principle advisor to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and NATO on all maritime issues, maintaining situational awareness in the maritime environment, collating the Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP) and feeding this into the NATO Common Operating Picture (NCOP). MARCOM's NATO Shipping Centre also provides close liaison, advice, support and coordination with international and commercial maritime agencies and shipping organisations across the world; further enhancing maritime safety in the global commons and ensuring NATO's appropriate understanding of ongoing commercial shipping traffic. This global maritime situational awareness contributes to information superiority, supports NATO decision-making, and is a critical enabler to trigger effective allied military action in response to any specific or potential threats to the Alliance or international shipping lanes.





The Standing Naval Forces in the Baltic Sea region include SNMG1 and SNMCMG1, which regularly visit the principal ports along the Baltic coast; taking time out from their security patrols and mine-hunting tasks. These tasks include considerable efforts to clear the littoral coast from historical ordnance – unexploded mines and munitions left over from the Second World War. Constantly on standby and permanently certified “ready” for operations, the SNF (normally six ships from various nations in each group) provide NATO’s immediate maritime response to any emerging crisis, and provide the maritime component of NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force. The SNF also participate in major joint NATO and national military exercises such as the US BALTOPS and the recent Exercise DYNAMIC GUARDIAN. It is in these port visits that the SNF meets and coordinates with NATO’s force integration units and with the eFP battlegroups to conduct joint Maritime-Land Integration activities (MLI).

The MLI elements involve a number of maritime capabilities provided by these NATO Naval Forces to support the eFP battlegroups and Baltic States Host Nation Defence Forces

(HNDF). In coordination with HQ MNC-NE, MARCOM is increasing its interactions and exercises with these land elements to further practise and enhance NATO’s ability to defend against any potential aggression, promote peace, and assure sovereignty. These significant maritime capabilities span the spectrum: from Special Forces deployed by submarine or aircraft, Amphibious Assault, Carrier Strike Aircraft conducting air policing or ground attack, (potentially including the new JF-35 stealth fighters from UK’s new Queen Elizabeth carriers and US supercarriers), Strategic Precision Guided Weapons (Submarine, aircraft and ship-launched Tomahawk, and SCALP missiles with a range of up to 1500km), Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD), NATO Warships carrying the MBDA ASTOR 30 or Raytheon AEGIS SM-3/6 missiles (which can engage hostile missile and aircraft targets some 100-200km inland), Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS - previously known as Naval Gunfire Support), to the more mundane but equally important logistics (Sea Lines of Control, Maritime Transport and logistics supply, Medevac). Many of these more dramatic activities are rehearsed in large, joint NATO exercises. In the main, however, ongoing coordination involves increasing familiarity between the SNF and their eFP BG/HNDF counterparts by providing exchange briefings during the port visits and conducting communications exercises to ensure the soldiers will be able to call on these capabilities if needed. Additional activities include training seminars on NSFS and IAMD to train and certify army forward observation officers and ground-based air defence units to call Joint Fires inland from ships off-shore.

In conjunction with MARCOM, HQ MNC-NE have established a new Naval Support Request (NSR) process that encourages

and enhances these MLI activities. With both the troops in the eFP BGs and the ships in the SNF rotating every six months, an objective is for every passage of SNF elements into the Baltic Sea region to involve a port visit, exchange briefings, communications exercise in each of the four Baltic states (including Poland), and a centralised NSFS seminar, and a live-fire 'shore bombardment' exercise. This is assured by conducting monthly coordination meetings and biannual training and exercise coordination conferences with all the interested headquarters. This increasing interaction and mutual understanding of processes and capabilities will ensure that NATO Forces in the Baltic states, including the staffs in the NATO Multi-National Corps and Divisions Headquarters, as well as the national HNDF brigade Headquarters, are confident and capable of bringing to bear the military power NATO's navies can bring to the fight in support of land forces defending the borders of these states.

On 11-12 June this year, 30 Artillery Forward Observers from the Estonian, Lithuanian and Polish eFP Battlegroups' Fire Support Teams congregated at the German Army Putlos Ranges near Heilingenshafen to conduct a Live-Fire NSFS GUNEX, directing the guns of SNF's SNMG1 who had formed a gun-line with the Danish Frigate HDMS ABSALON (127mm Gun) and the Canadian HCMS HALIFAX (57mm Bofors rapid-firing Gun) in the adjacent Hohwachter Buchts Sea Range. For the first time in decades, gunfire from a NATO Maritime formation was directed onto shore targets by soldiers from Multi-National NATO Battlegroups; demonstrating both the

potential Joint and Multi-National fighting capabilities of NATO's forces in the Baltic Sea Region.

With the ever-evolving and ongoing adjustment of NATO to meet and mitigate emerging threats, the Alliance responds and adapts with new land formations, such as the Headquarters Multi-National Corps-South East now established in Sibiu, Romania. Similar to MNC-NE in the Baltics, this new headquarters is focused on providing NATO's first response to emergent regional threats in South-East Europe, and along the western coast of The Black Sea. They also coordinate baseline and exercise activities of NATO formations and forces assigned to NATO's Tailored Forward Presence (TFP). Akin to the efforts in the Baltic Sea Region, MARCOM has SNF elements frequently operating in the Black Sea Region: SNMG2 and SNMCMG 2. The BSR Maritime-Land integration model is equally suited for similar adoption in the South-East Europe and the Black Sea Region. MARCOM continues to establish a similar relationship with LANDCOM's newest Corps Headquarters to provide comparable support and coordination in this equally important and complex potential theatre of operations. This June, MNC-NE completed its first Command Post Exercise during DEFENDER 21 and has now declared Initial Operating Capability (IOC). It was supported by 120 Staff mentors from the UK-Based Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC was NATO's first Land Corps Headquarters and formed in 1994) which included three Maritime Specialist attached from MARCOM for the exercise to provide a Maritime focus in their endeavours. **LC**



COM MARCOM, Vice Admiral Keith Blount CB OBE is the coordinating authority for maritime matters with adjacent NATO Commands. He is NATO's principle maritime advisor and has operational command of NATO's Standing Naval Forces. COM MARCOM's tasks are to be prepared to plan, conduct and support maritime operations in order to contribute to the deterrence of aggression and the preservation of peace, security and the territorial integrity of alliance member states.

Joining the Royal Navy in 1984 as a helicopter pilot within two years he was a front line aviator at the age of 20. Through a varied flying career, he qualified as an instructor and flew in the Royal Navy Helicopter Display Team. He has commanded three warships, including the helicopter carrier HMS OCEAN and sailed in NATO Task Groups during Operation Sharpguard and Operation Active Endeavour. He was the Iraqi Maritime Task Group


Commander during Operation TELIC and, more recently, was the United Kingdom's Maritime Component Commander, based in Bahrain, spanning Operations in Syria and Iraq.

Vice Admiral Blount holds a Master of Arts degree in Defence Studies and is a Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society. Appointed Officer of the Order of the British Empire in 2012, he was awarded an operational Legion of Merit by the President of the United States in 2016. Blount was appointed Companion of the Order of the Bath in 2018. Between 2015 and 2019 he was the Head of the Fleet Air Arm and the officer accountable for the Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers. Having previously been Chief of Staff to the European Union Naval Force and Deputy Commander of the Combined Maritime Forces, he was appointed as the Commander of NATO's Maritime Command in May 2019.





# LANDCOM JOINT FIRES PERSONNEL TRAINED DURING EXERCISE RAMSTEIN AMBITION 21



*It is no longer a matter of the soldier making his plan for battle on the ground and then turning to see how the air can help him. Land and air operations must be deliberately planned to get the best out of each other.*

## INTRODUCTION

These words from the senior commander of the United Kingdoms Royal Air Force, Sir John Cotesworth Slessor, in 1936 still resonate with contemporary operations. As in the past, it is still imperative that air and land forces deliberately coordinate action to achieve effect.

## FROM AFGHANISTAN TO THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

From 2001, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan saw a rapid and ongoing revolution in this relationship: air power was almost exclusively employed directly with the land component, often compromising limited troop numbers of small American Special Operations Forces (SOF) teams and local rebels. The conflict began in a traditional way with air power employed to strike key Taliban targets in order to secure control of the air. During the subsequent land campaign SOF targeted the

Taliban with the support of offensive air; the result was that Taliban forces were removed from key population centers across Afghanistan by the end of 2001. The combined power and effect of the Air and Land components was clear evidence of the importance of having effective Air Land Integration.

But real world scenarios and the Alliances potential adversaries change and today NATO has to be prepared to face a peer adversary and operate in Multi-Domain Operations. This means Air supremacy cannot be guaranteed as was the case during the Counter-Insurgent Operation in Afghanistan. Fighting against a peer adversary would mean different Air assets allocation with priority to Offensive and Defensive Counter Air operations (OCA/DCA), competing against potentially hundreds of Air Support Requests from Land forces to Joint Force Air Component (JFAC) that require de-confliction and prioritization.

## THE GROUND LIAISON ELEMENT

This is the role of the Ground Liaison Element (GLE). GLE is COM LCC's direct representative in JFAC HQ. It is responsible to explain his intent and provide cross-functional area advice, thus ensuring LCC's requirements are given the right emphasis throughout the Air/Land operation. The GLE must have comprehensive, up to date situational awareness of the land scheme of maneuver to convey to JFAC HQ. It ensures that LCC targeting priorities are properly translated within Air targeting execution; it provides input of the Battle Space Management to synchronize with the Air Space Management; it processes the Air Support Requests (ASRs) with the right priority and ensures land maneuver is properly understood.



Every twenty-four hours an Air Tasking Order (ATO) is released. Hundreds of sorties need to be accurately planned, synchronized and de-conflicted. The ATO born in the Strategic Division (SD), where the COM JFAC intent is reflected in the Air Operation Directive (AOD), this then matures with the Combat Plan Division (CPD). It is in the CPD where the role of GLE starts to become essential. The Com LCC's representative explain in detail the Air Support Requests (ASR) the Land forces are asking for and why is it needed. This daily effort is completed in order to be coherent, not only with the Land scheme of maneuver but also to be coherent with the overall Joint Force Commander's intent.

One of the key conditions for an effective GLE is sustainable manning, as there is a requirement to cover every JFAC Battle Rhythm event. Currently, the GLE is an element sent to the JFAC when required for

### EXERCISE RAMSTEIN AMBITION 21

From 3-14 May 2021, AIRCOM conducted their annual internal exercise known as RAMSTEIN AMBITION (RAAM21), held in Ramstein (Germany). The exercise is a two week Command Post Exercise (CPX) that provides key training for NATO's Air Command and Control specialists in a Small Air Heavy Joint Operation within a Joint Environment. This fictitious scenario, based on real life events, presents an excellent opportunity to train and practice Air Land Integration (ALI) in order to test GLE procedures.

During the exercise, four staff members from LANDCOM HQ travelled to Ramstein to be part of the Primary Training Audience (PTA) within a Ground Liaison Element (GLE). The GLE was led by an ARRC OF-5 and composed of representatives from UK JFAC with the support of the 19th US BCD. It was a great chance for LANDCOM representatives to see how a GLE works within a JFAC.

The JFAC is a core element responsible for the Command and Control of air assets and it is one of the most integrated, flexible, responsive and high tempo military processes in existence. The characteristic of Air power places great importance on the accurate coordination and synchronization of the Air Plan. To ensure the coordination and synchronization of effects the following process is followed:

exercises and operations. Nevertheless, having a permanent liaison element within AIRCOM would allow both LCC and ACC staffs to work and train as a single entity, based on daily trusted relationships and continuous training. This would reduce the barriers that sometimes seems to exist between the separate components, where each Domain feels it is the most important and requires the support of the others services. Often this is only a question of mutual knowledge and answering, "What Land can do for Air and what Air can do for Land".

LANDCOM is working on this ambitious project that, if completed, would enhance effective Air Land Integration. **LC**



# A THOUGHT FROM THE WARFIGHTING CORPS HQ



## THE PHENOMENON OF INFLUENCE

By British Army Major Mark J MARTIN SO2 Strategic Communications HQ ARRC

In the beginning of civilization, there was the orator who told tales in the oral tradition. Since then, the telling of stories has evolved in numerous, more innovative, and technologically advance ways at an ever-quicken pace. Despite these advances, the battle of the narrative has been a consistent facet of military commanders and operations. Additionally, the thirst for information about events, opinion, and of course, other people, remain an enduring human psychological trait. Because of this, the ability to harness influence has always been a facet of power, including military power. Therefore, to adapt a common military parlance: the nature of influence remains consistent, and its characters evolve.

However, the terminology of influence is not well understood, perhaps even less so in its application to military operations. This short article is not academic, professional doctrinal thought, or even an explanation concerning influence. It is to be nothing more than an introduction to explore the phenomenon of influence, its purpose, and its effect as understood by those who seek to understand it at the Corps level in a warfighting role. In doing so, it is to stimulate deeper conversation amongst the community about the importance of influence, its potential within our profession, and its role within all our lives.

### WHAT IS INFLUENCE?

Influence is about generating behaviour. Such behaviours can be manifested in the cognitive, physical or virtual dimensions of our lives. We are all influencers and influenced in many ways, ranging from our politics, values, family, interests and preferences. Therefore, the ability to communicate effectively via the appropriate medians between influencer and the influenced is paramount. In short, influence is the ability to get others to think and/or do something.

### WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF INFLUENCE?

Influence is ever present in all our lives. We are all targeted by product marketing and suggested content. This is driven by our own innate psychological traits to seek products and information that we feel are relevant, relatable and important to ourselves. Therefore, influence is a consistently revolving cycle of personal psychological need and the will of others to create desired behaviour from us. The latter could range from aligning political values to vote a particular way, or generating the idea that you need a particular product that compels you to go out and buy it. Knowing that we are all influenced and have the ability to influence, we should all be cognicent of the fact that everything we read and view has a purpose to generate a particular response in us.



## THE UNCHANGING NATURE OF INFLUENCE

If everything portrayed to us today by word of mouth (oral tradition), writing or pictorially has a purpose, it is safe to assume this was even more true in the 'content' of the historical past, when content was less ubiquitous and a more precious commodity. As historians will tell you, nothing is unbiased in history and every document, monument, and art piece had a purpose. For example, a medieval castle was not just a practical place of defence, but a representation of authority, deterrence, safety, rule of law, community and wealth. Such is an example of Strategic Communication to effect the thoughts of individuals who not only lived there, but anyone who saw or even heard about it. Thus, generating and crafting the perceptions of individuals through words and deeds is nothing new to create influence

## INFLUENCE IN MILITARY OPERATIONS

Influence is often viewed as a 'non-kinetic' or 'soft effect', usually related to counter-insurgency operations. This is reflected in the various unclassified publications such as Allied Joint Doctrine Publication 3.10 (Information Operations) and counter-insurgency manuals. Ever more, the evolution of doctrinal thinking around 'grey-zone' confrontation and 'three block war' (most recently reflected in the US Joint Doctrinal

Note 1.19 Competition Continuum) that blurs the boundaries between what we know as war, insurgency and destabilising a-symmetric warfare, seems to perpetuate this. However, through the experience of training and conceptually developing as the warfighting corps, the 'non-kinetic' or 'soft effect' view is not only outdated, but incorrect. It can be considered that a communication, strategic or tactical, can be made via kinetic effect, including the purpose of deterrence in support of diplomatic effect/coercive diplomacy. Innovative methods of influence on the battlefield should be explored as a foundation of military planning, rather than a decorative afterthought.

## THE MISUNDERSTANDING OF SOCIAL MEDIA

Social media is an unavoidable facet of modern life. The reach of communication has never been so instant and ubiquitous, and the effectiveness of that communication has never been harder to judge. Many, particularly in military circles, believe that social media content, such as 'tweets' or 'stories' generates influence and an effective presence. While there is the psychological need that people in general are intrigued to know what happens in particular Regiments for example, often the content is not planned for any intended effect other than to be 'seen to do something' and in nearly all cases lack a 'call to action' (the resultant behaviour desired). Thus, many within the military tend to only successfully communicate with themselves and their own military community. The result of which is an effective echo-chamber giving rise to the belief that 'we' are communicating effectively through numbers of 'likes' or 'shares'. Yet the reality is that this is nothing more than vanity, which is probably the main reason why most participate on social media. But, the effective result is that 'we' are unable to see why 'we' are unable to break out into the wider community and engage with potential interest. Therefore, it is seemingly true that the military community may misunderstand social media fundamentally, and utilize it more effectively to harness the potential to create networks of interest, support efforts to inform and educate the wider public, and generate effective recruiting opportunities.

## SO WHAT?

Over the last 18 months, understanding the phenomenon of influence has been a perpetual complex problem for HQ ARRC as it drove towards Corps Warfighting. While the desire to generate influence and effect behaviours is nothing new, its application in a changed technological and interconnected landscape is a challenge. In general, while the individual can logically understand the phenomenon of influence, the importance and application of influence is seemingly less understandable at the community level (despite being sought after). The potential of influence activities remains vast and innovative. Hopefully, this short article has made you (or, dare we say, influenced you) to consider what role influence plays in your life, and how can you personally and professional apply this basic understanding of influence in the future. **LC**



The military is one of the most important areas for the application of leadership. It is a truism today that what organizations and individuals want to achieve cannot be accomplished by a single leader at the top or by any one member of an organization. Armies are a means of achieving collective goals; neither a military operation nor an international sporting event can be completed by one person alone. Rather, it requires a targeted, cooperative collaboration of many individuals and collectives which must be coordinated by state-of-the-art leadership.

## LEADERSHIP TODAY

### An Introduction to Leadership

Leadership today faces very many new conditions including delimitation, globalization, networking, virtualization etc. (Kellermann, 2012; Hauser, 2013; Scharmer, 2015). Thus, a growing number of unpredictable, open situations in an increasingly turbulent, complex, and chaotic environment appear.

In order to address this, old, new, and timeless insights have to be re-evaluated over and over again (Campell, 2013). The military is one of the most important areas for the application of leadership. Armies are a means of achieving collective goals, which requires a targeted cooperative collaboration of many individuals and collectives which must be coordinated by leadership. The following presents some thoughts towards such a coordination.

### Who is a Leader?

Leadership must not be confused with headship (Weibler, 2016). Leadership presupposes the criterion of the voluntarily shown acceptance of the leader by the followers. At a basic level, it requires acceptance by those being led, and only this acceptance allows the full engagement of followers in work or in a project (Neuberger, 2002; Weibler, 2016; Blessin / Wick, 2014). Leadership goes beyond a formal management, supervisor or control function. It aims to ensure the team's internal and external cooperation, which is necessary for optimal task processing, and to counteract dysfunctional tendencies and conflicts.

Command and Control means that obedience can be required on the basis of a formal superior function. Leadership means that the followers act voluntarily with their full potential for the good of the team, the organization or the project. Not every superior is automatically a leader, and not every subordinate is automatically led by his superior.

Followers have a cognitive information processing in which they define whether and to what extent someone is considered a leader. Different theories exist for this, such as "the process of being perceived by the others as a leader" (Lord and Maher,

Headship	Leadership
The superior has a formally assigned position as a superior given by a higher echelon. A superior is made by a higher superior.	The leader has the acceptance of the led, and thus he has followers. A leader is made by the follower(s).

1991, p.11). Today's process-theories are well-recognized, especially the theories which deal with the leader identity. These theories stress the need for a leader to retain a leader's identity and the acceptance of the followers. If one of these components is missing then the person is only a superior who can practice headship (command and control) but cannot practice leadership, because they have no followers. The process theory of De Rue and Ashford (2010), as one example, shows the development of a leader identity by claiming and granting processes, through the acceptance and internalization of the Leader and Follower relationship and how their roles are generated (see Figure 1).




Figure 1: Process of constructing identity and acceptance, derived from De Rue and Ashford, 2010

The military generally has a special role due to its strict hierarchical organization and regularly changing posts. Today, however, it is inevitable that everyone realizes that a superior and control position is not automatically equated with leadership. To be a leader, a superior needs a leadership identity (De Rue and Ashford, 2010) and the prerequisites for this are:

- Individual Internalization
- Relational Recognition (leader- follower)
- Collective endorsement (leader-follower)

The self-image of leadership must therefore be constantly questioned, and leadership is dynamic and cannot be learned through a weekend course. It is a role which needs daily practice.

### Curiosities in Military Leadership

The ingratiation phenomenon:

Since promotion to a higher rank in the military is generally linked to conforming to expected behavior, subordinates often only adapt their superficial behaviour. This ingratiation phenomenon, in which the upward feedback leads superiors to believe that they are satisfied and agreed with, is a well-researched theory (Derler and Weibler, 2014; Hogan, 1994; Tourish, 2013).

Additionally scientific research has found that there are clear indications that superiors prefer to reap conformity and

approval than criticism. Studies show that superiors respond to criticism with ignorance, rejection or restrictions (Derler and Weibler, 2014; Tourish, 2013; Weibler, 2020)

The paralyzing effect:

There is a mimetic desire in the hierarchy, i.e. subordinates and superiors both strive for advancement in their career goals. But since the positions are limited, a superior cannot have any interest in the advancement of a subordinate who may outperform them in the end. On the other hand, a superior should motivate their subordinates, which often leads to pathological forms of reaction and behavior (Weibler, 2020).

### Interim - Conclusion

Leadership through command (instruction) and control may no longer be appropriate in all contexts (Rauner, 2014). Therefore the self-image of leadership needs to be questioned and the leadership philosophy which is known as mission command may be more suitable in some circumstances.

### MISSION COMMAND

#### Introduction to Mission Command

Mission command is acknowledged in some nations' forces and as well in NATO, but it is not consistently described, so there is room for misinterpretation and misunderstanding. While some armies have practiced mission command for a long time, it came into NATO and some of the Allies relatively recently in the 1990s. This is due to growing consequence of facing unpredictable

and uncertain contexts, and thus a need for commanding and acting in a more flexible way (ATP 3.2.2; ATP 3.2.1.3; ATrainP-6; C 227/0-0-1501; Flynn and Schrankel, 2013; Shamir, 2011; Storr, 2003; Vogelaar and Kramer, 2004).

Mission command, in most approaches is a philosophy of leadership or at least an instrument for leadership which touches the type and make of collaboration (Storr, 2003; Wittman, 2012; Vassilou and Alberts, 2017; German Heeresdienstvorschrift, 1923; ATP 3.2.2; ATP 3.2.1.3, 2021 (Draft); ATrainP-6, 2020; C 227/0-0-1501, 2017).

### A Short History

The Italian diplomat and political theorist Niccolò Machiavelli (1469 -1527) stressed the need for collaboration in his book "The Prince". He stated that even a prince can only be successful if he utilizes the strengths of his ministers, and that collaboration in general creates camaraderie and thus hinders disunity and rebellion.

Carl von Clausewitz stressed in his "Principles of War" the need for timely and swift decisions, thus never to wasting time. "Unless important advantages are to be gained from hesitation, it is necessary to get to work at once" (von Clausewitz, 1812).



In the 20th and 21th Centuries, military experiences and lessons learned have further

resulted in principles relating to practicing mission command, such as the examples of General Rommel in World War I, General Schwarzkopf in the Iraqi war, or recently in Afghanistan within “Operation Anaconda” or “Dinner Out”. When General Schwarzkopf was leading “Desert Storm” he stated to be in a VUCA situation (volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous), because the enemy was unknown, the location



was unknown and, he had to lead forces from several nations which were also unknown Allies. In such a situation, mission command was seen to be a successful approach.

As a conclusion of these simplified historical examples it seems that mission command is a suitable approach for obtaining the desired operational effect, especially in unpredictable, complex and critical situations and contexts. It seems to be a successful leadership approach in a VUCA world.



### Shortcut of a Definition and Content:

Mission command dictates the who, what, where, and why in the big picture, and never the micromanagement of the “how to”. Mission Command is the Army’s approach to a “command and control” which empowers subordinates decision-making




Figure 2: Command and Control vs. Mission Command

and execution appropriate to the real situation on the spot. Commanders know the mission, give their clear intention, achievable objectives, and provide the required resources, forces and time to the executive level. Through mission command, the responsibility of execution, and the required freedom of action for this execution, is given to the subordinate level, including the willingness to allow them to make mistakes. Granting this kind of autonomy to them enhances the feeling of responsibility and creates intrinsic motivation (Keith and Frese, 2015). In this way, it enhances agility and flexibility in general, and also allows each leader to focus on their own level of responsibility and tasks. The Allied Tactical Publication (ATP 3.2.2) mentions that mission command consists of the four elements:

- Commander’s intent
- Subordinates’ initiative
- Mission-type orders
- Resource allocation

The principles of mission command are as shown in Figure 3:

### Principles of Mission Command

- Trust (mutual trust)
- Mission issued orders
- Commanders intent
- Shared understanding in all echelons of an organization (#education & training in mission command)
- Disciplined Initiative & Risk Management
- COMPETENCE




Figure 3: Principles of Mission Command

Mutual trust is needed for mission command to work; an adoption “trust culture” up and down the chain of command, in contrast to a strictly downward “control culture”. Trust is a complex psychological construct that can neither be ordered (commanded) nor be controlled. Trust only develops over a time, based on perceptions, acceptance and performance in the individuals’ knowing, being and doing of followers as well as leaders. There are trust givers and trust takers. Mission command only works if it is developed on long-term sight during the training and education process at the different echelons. But when it works, the soldiers WANT to carry out their leaders’ intent because they accept, trust and follow them. On the other hand, leaders who practise Mission Command know they have trust because a strong commander does not know weak soldiers, and they



can count on their followers' competences because they are willing to use them for the good of the mission or organization.

## Summary and Conclusion

According to the generally accepted understanding, leadership always takes the form of a **LEADERSHIP RELATIONSHIP**. Leadership is therefore a relational concept, the quality of which depends on the relationship between the leader and those being led. This relationship can be based on a "trust culture" or a "control culture", which in turn determines the leadership philosophy, as well as the outcomes. Mission Command only works within a "trust culture".

When things go not as planned, leaders may go inwards and take the command and control position. But, maybe it would be more successful to searching for the best solution together with others, instead of executing power over others granted by the hierarchy position.

As armies tend to be hierarchical and conservative in education and mindset, it must be emphasized that overall it is not about a valuation of whether leadership with a Mission Command or Command and Control leadership style is better or worse, but rather than that they often behave in a complementary way and should therefore be applied or combined depending on the context. In any case, leadership with Mission Command must be established when there is time, not when there is need, and maybe the momentum is now. **LC**

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# THE MAKING OF A CFIT

By British Army Major Will GEORGE, LANDCOM CFIT, G3



**AS** the ancient Chinese proverb says, 'Every great journey starts with a single step'. For the LANDCOM Capabilities and Force Integration Team (CFIT), this single step occurred on October 1, 2019 when the LANDCOM Chief of Staff signed Directive 080-005 outlining the roles and functions of CFIT. In the pre-COVID 19 days, where there was freedom to travel and entering a shop did not require a temperature check, ambitions for this new concept were high. The time that has elapsed since October 2019 has been unprecedented due to disruptions in everyday life and working practices. What started as a localized problem quickly developed into a global issue that has affected all levels of society. Regardless, CFIT ambition remains high, even as the size of the task and the difficulties of the COVID crisis have slowed progress.

## THE JOURNEY

We see two primary meanings to this Chinese proverb. The first is that to complete any task (journey), the first initial step must be taken – no matter how long the journey or how laborious the task – a simple movement is required to start it. Great things can emerge from a simple beginning. Secondly, the proverb uses two paradoxical phrases, 'great journey' and 'single step', which suggests difficult tasks or long journeys can be broken down into constituent parts or tasks. The completion of each section will lead to a successful outcome and mission accomplishment. This article will introduce the CFIT concept, outline the 'steps' LANDCOM CFIT has taken so far on its journey to Full Operational Capacity (FOC), the challenges it

has met on the way, and provide some thoughts on how the concept will mature and develop into the future.

## THE CONCEPT

The LANDCOM CFIT is responsible for developing and coordinating a continuous process for increasing interoperability and enhancing pre-planned and prepared, mission-critical non-NATO Command Structure capabilities for the delivery of effects. The CFIT also acts as the NATO Force Structure (NFS) information collection focal point within LANDCOM. By enhancing linkages and coordination with National Military Representatives (NMRs), NATO agencies, and other important actors in the capability development field, CFIT will increase NATO visibility and awareness of nationally retained capabilities and improve Mutually Agreed Access (MAA) between both the NATO Command Structure (NCS) and NFS, and with NATO's strategic partners.

## CFIT DEVELOPMENT

The genesis for the CFIT concept was the BI-SC NATO Command Structure Implementation (25 April 2018). This identified the requirement for improved situational awareness and understanding to enhance the ability to synchronize and coordinate beyond the NCS. Strategic Commands (SC) required the flexibility to rapidly integrate additional functionality, including national effects, into the command structures as new security challenges emerge. Importantly, this could include drawing on functionalities found in nationally retained capabilities as well as the declared NFS. The establishment of CFITs aimed to assist in the revitalization of the credible deterrence posture, improve warfighting readiness and meet the strategic challenges of the day.

The concept proposed stronger relations with multinational and national command entities networked through CFITs to establish direct and persistent relations with the NFS and nations to strengthen interoperability, integration, and mutual knowledge between the NCS, NFS, and nations. CFITs require connectivity with these non-NCS entities during baseline activities and current operations (BACO) to enable a secure and stable transition from BACO, through Crisis, to Maximum Level of Effort. CFITs therefore, represent an essential tool enabling greater reliance on the NFS and tapping into the full potential of the Alliance.

## LANDCOM CFIT- THE STEPS SO FAR

A fundamental tenant of the CFIT concept is the development of habitual relationships between LANDCOM, Land Force Commands, and key NFS elements. One of the earliest steps of CFIT was, therefore, to reach out to NFS to establish a point of contact, develop a relationship, build trust, and arrange face-to-face meetings. Like any role in the military, people are at the

center of everything CFIT does. It was key that we were able to develop relationships with external command structures and individuals based on trust, respect, and honesty. These people would allow the MAA concept to be fully implemented. This was to be achieved by person to person, face-to-face, physical contacts. As CFIT took these early steps, it quickly became apparent that within two months of commencing the process of developing contacts with NFS, the limitations to travel arising from COVID would provide a severe challenge to any ambition for face-to-face contacts. This has undeniably slowed the process of the development of habitual relationships and, although other communication means have been used, the building of trust, developed through physical contact has suffered.

### **FOCUSED DEVELOPMENT**

The enforced reduction in movement has enabled a concentrated and sustained focus on the conceptual development of CFIT. The key outputs from this focused conceptual development in 2020 have been: The CFIT role has been refined for both the MC-LCC and TLC roles; SOPs and SOIs developed; the Allied Land Domain Running Estimate has been established; Measures of Performance and Measures of Effect written; the basis for the Repository of Knowledge created; the road map to FOC developed; and the reporting structure, content, and format designed. This more traditional 'staff work' provides a bedrock on which CFIT activity can build. The architecture has been put in place to develop the links between LANDCOM, NFS, and Land Forces. The challenge of restricted movements means that CFIT remains in a conceptual state and this architecture is yet to be tested. The development of doctrine, procedures, and methods of evaluation has enabled only a very limited ability to test the concept through internal exercises, simulations, and wargaming to examine the validity of the progress made. So far this has occurred primarily through participation in the CREVALs. Although not focused on CFIT, these have enabled some minor experimentation and testing of the CFIT concept.

### **GRASSROOTS DEVELOPMENT**

The direction from SHAPE CFI was for CFIT development to be primarily a bottom-up, grassroots process. Therefore, the development of this staff work has involved regular contact with SHAPE CFIT and reaching out across NATO to AIRCOM and MARCOM. This useful exchange of ideas has been beneficial for all involved and we have all reached the same point in our development and face similar challenges to progress. The key challenge for 2021 across CFITs remains the often-painful progression for any new organization or team to move from the conceptual to the theoretical stage. The drive is to achieve FOC by the end of the year. This difficult next step in CFIT development requires the ability to repeatedly test the concept, gather data, participate in exercises, and establishment of face-to-face contacts. This will require the maximum level of exercise participation, resulting in a demanding travel and exercise schedule for the Branch. At a minimum, in 2021 CFIT will participate in Exercise's, LOYAL VISION, LOYAL BONUS, STEADFAST JUPITER, STEADFAST JACKAL, LOYAL LEDA, DEFENDER as well as the Crisis Response Planning, all

developmental conferences, as well as scope the possibility of national exercise participation. A prioritized list of engagements has been established and set out in the 2021 Work Plan. There is very little 'white space' in the CFIT calendar and achieving a high level of ambition (and results) will be a demanding task for the members of the Branch.

The enforced period of limited travel has also presented an opportunity to develop a team and organizational ethos, behaviors, and culture. With a clear command structure established and all within the team comfortable with delegated empowerment, this has been a challenging process. Moving into 2021, CFIT is increasingly adept at responding to the dynamic situation, maintaining its tempo of activity through the cultivation of 360 degree communication within LANDCOM, but also increasingly with the NFS and other SSC as our network of contacts develops and grows. A battle rhythm has been established that supports our key outputs and our progression along the road to FOC.

### **THE CHALLENGES**

The initial team of three in 2019 has increased to a team of eight at the start of 2021. Further positions will be filled throughout the year. The structures are now in place to incorporate new individuals into the teams aligned to NFS and Nations. A challenge for 2021 will be to develop a CFIT training package, either bespoke to LANDCOM CFIT or from SHAPE CFI. There is currently no specific CFI training for individuals, which creates a lack of awareness across NATO about the roles and utility of CFIT, but also requires time on first arrival to train and assimilate individuals. Increasing the awareness and visibility of CFIT across LANDCOM and wider is a key challenge of 2021.

The second key challenge for the coming year, identified during internal training sessions, is the scale of the task and the generic challenge inherent to 'integration'. There is no perfect plan to achieve Force Integration. Force Integration within NFS has been likened to assembling a 30,000 piece jigsaw puzzle where the picture changes every day and you don't get all the new pieces. The development of the Repository of Knowledge and the software enabling it should develop a clearer picture. The steps taken in this ongoing work, in conjunction with ATC, will provide the basis for CFIT ability to have an impact on the decision-making process within LANDCOM.

### **CONCLUSION**

The level of ambition for LANDCOM CFIT remains high. The 2021 Work Plan has been approved and released. This outlines the division of labor across the Branch and the further steps required. Some of the steps taken so far have been hesitant, some have been stumbles, some have been steps in the wrong direction, and some have been great strides forward. The commonality is that they are all steps on the CFIT journey, the journey that will lead to FOC by the end of 2021. To achieve this mission there will be many more steps to take and, although the accomplishment of FOC still seems some way off, the work plan for 2021 is in place detailing how this long journey is broken down into its constituent parts, and the measures CFIT will take to achieve the destination of FOC. **LC**




**A**frica is the world's second largest landmass, the fastest-growing and most populated continent, and hosts one of the fastest growing regional economies. China has shown growing interest in the African Continent the last two decades, and have surpassed major conventional players in almost all spheres of influence. These developments have attracted global attention to understand Chinese desires and how these events impact international competition in other areas.

This article examines key areas of the Chinese endeavor in Africa, and tries to provide insight on how these events might possibly affect geopolitics in the continent.


Africa is home to 54 countries (28 percent of total number of countries in the world) covering 30 million square km land (second largest continent and 20 percent of world's land mass), and creates \$2.42 billion economic output (3 percent of global economy). Figure 1 provides countries' economic sizes and

growth figures to help illustrate the economic potential in the continent.

#### Total GDP: 2,420 bn US\$



#### GDP Growth %




#### GDP per Capita Growth %

2010 Constant US\$	2000	2010	2019	Growth 21
North Africa	20.473	27.573	25.357	
Sub-Saharan Africa	74.640	103.807	104.202	
China	1.768	4.550	8.255	
India	827	1.358	2.152	
Russia	6.491	10.675	12.012	


Figure 1 African Key Economic Figures / Source: the World Bank, the UN, and Author's own calculations

The diversity among the countries is not limited to economics; it's prevalent in the social sphere as well. There are an estimated 2,000 spoken languages, seven religions practiced by more than 1.2 billion people (15 percent of World's population), and 3,000 tribes. Despite geopolitically referred to all as Africa, each country has its own economic, political and cultural dynamic that needs individual attention.

There has always been strong international attention for the continent, mainly by the Western countries for energy, minerals and precious stones. The continent has roughly 10 percent of the oil and gas reserves in the world, which makes it highly dependent on global oil market. Libya, Nigeria, Algeria, Mozambique, Egypt and Angola have the largest reserves, while Angola also is China's fourth largest oil supplier (Figure 2).




In parallel to its longstanding adherence to non-interference policy and domestic growth challenges, China had not pursued a far-reaching foreign policy in Africa. However, particularly in the last decade, China's opening of a military base, contributing troops to the UN, engaging in military and security deals,



procuring a large share of its oil demand, disbursing large amounts of loans, and obtaining concessional rights are signaling a change in China's foreign policy approach. China

in the recent years has become the largest customer, supplier, investor, builder, donor and troop contributor (under the UN) for Africa. Chinese exports to African countries, for instance, has increased dramatically since early 2000s, particularly when compared to the other main players (Figure 3).

On the other hand, despite the increased level of activity, African markets still make up a relatively small part of China's global economic activity and the continent has low priority in China's strategic planning. Chinese exports and investment in Africa each account for only 5 percent of their global figures (Figure 4 and 5).



**Belt and Road Initiative (BRI):** Adopted in 2013, this is a transcontinental long-term Chinese policy and investment program, which aims at infrastructure development and acceleration of the economic integration of countries along the route of the historic Silk Road. As of December 2020, 49 countries in Africa had already signed MOUs with Chinese government.

China is active in all spheres, including diplomatic, information, economic and military. Since 2013, these efforts have been framed within China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that focuses on developing African infrastructure and enhancing trade (46 out of 54 countries in Africa had joined BRI by 2020). Chinese investments cover a wide array of economics including communication, transportation and telecommunications but are argued to have limited impact on African development.

## FINANCIAL LOANS

Chinese presence in Africa is observed most intense in countries' external debts; though new loans since 2016 reportedly are in decline, given the global economic slowdown and increase indebtedness of African countries. Having the largest share of the continent's external debt, China is argued to be pursuing a "debt trap diplomacy" to actually draw African countries towards its own sphere of influence and eventually seize critical African assets. However, there are no clear indications on such Chinese strategy yet. Angola accounts for majority of loans in return for oil deliveries (Figure 6). China, providing funds for



Angola's infrastructure development while filling in demand of US's declining oil demand.

Once again, Chinese presence is seen mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa, where its influence has mainly focused. 92 percent of committed loans were reported to be towards Sub-Saharan African countries. In terms of share in total debtness, Chinese loans were the greatest in Central, Western and Eastern regions of Africa (Figure 7).

to have 130-170 billion US\$ annual gap of infrastructure investments (2018).

Starting from the late 1990s to mid-2000s, FDI to Africa in general grew substantially. Investments to Sub-Saharan Africa continued to rise until 2012 as North Africa witnessed investments leaving the continent. Since 2015, mainly in parallel to slowdown in global and in particular in Chinese economy, FDI has mostly been negative for Sub-Saharan Africa and stable for North Africa, while Sub-Saharan Africa still continues to receive




Figure 7 Distribution of Chinese Loans in Africa / Source: CAR

Some of the highlighting points regarding Chinese crediting practices have been as follows.


- China accounts for 22 percent of African government external debt and 39 percent of government-to-government deals.
- Multilateral institutions like the World Bank accounts for 35 percent of African government external debt.
- Private bond holders account for roughly 30 percent of all debt (including non-guaranteed).
- Interest payments to private creditors external interest payments account for 55 percent.

## FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS (FDI)

Africa is in need of large amounts of investment to overcome its poor infrastructural problems. Despite the unprecedented flow of foreign direct investment (FDI), the Continent was reported

three times more investments annually than North Africa does (Figure 8). China, investing heavily on Sub-Saharan Africa in accordance with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), contributed to growing FDI gap between the two regions.

Great majority of African countries are underdeveloped, economies over reliant on natural resources (and thus their



global prices), have ongoing domestic conflicts and constant political fluctuations. These characteristics deteriorate economic sphere and cause FDI inflows to vary significantly from one year to another. Despite these mentioned risks, China has invested in and/or credited countries more in Sub-Saharan Region.

## ARMS SALES

Arms sales between 2016-20 and 2011-15 increased by 25 percent and 12 percent in Middle East and Europe, while decreased by 13 percent, 43 percent and 8 percent in Africa, the Americas and Asia and Oceania, respectively. Despite the decline, Africa continues to be one of China's most important arms market, given that a growing number of military and security deals are accompanied by buying of Chinese arms. Unfortunately for Africa, these sales are usually of lower quality equipment (compared to that of Western countries and Russia).

Chinese share, which accounted for 4 percent, dropping from 14 percent in 2015 and roughly 25 percent in 2013. China, 1) having its arms industry still developing (compared to that of Russia and the USA), 2) supplying large share of equipment to Chinese military and 3) focusing on sale of arms to Pakistan and Bangladesh, witnessed drop in share in African market (Figure 9).





Figure 9 Major Players in African Arms Market (2000-19) / Source: SIPRI

Exporters have different arms sales strategies for North and Sub-Saharan regions (Figure 10). From 2010 to 2019, Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for only 19 percent of imports where as shown in Figure 19-1. China closely followed Russia by 29 percent to 32 percent. During this period, arms imports has reportedly fell by 55 percent in 2015-19 compared to 2010-14.

Figure 10 African Arms Imports by Region / Source: SIPRI

In the same term, North Africa accounted for 81 percent of imports where, as shown in Figure 19-3. Russia accounted for 47 percent of imports, followed only by 19 percent by France and US. The import of arms has reportedly increased by 68 percent between 2015-19 and 2010-14. Algeria accounted for more than 75 percent of imports due to ongoing tensions with Morocco, conflict in Libya, surrounding extremist and separatist groups, and existence of military-led decision making in the political sphere.



## COVID-19 AND VACCINE

COVID-19 has struck the continent with new emerging variants. Economies were already in critical external debt levels before COVID-19 and are now struck by slowing external investments, slump in oil prices and increase health expenditures. Local health administrations underreport cases and death tolls and are far from accessing to sufficient number of vaccines before 2023. These creates valuable opportunities for China to exploit in improving soft power in the continent.

China and Russia, which have reportedly pre-booked half of world vaccine supply for 2021 are both competing and cooperating in the effort to reach out to regions in order to support their soft power development (Latin America, Asia and Africa). China, similar to Russia, is both selling and making agreements to build vaccine production facilities, which are expected to prolong their influence even after the pandemic wanes (Figure 11).


However, experts argue there are limitations for both China, and particularly Russia, in reaching the necessary production capacity to fulfill such high volumes. Domestic and export markets might create unexpected pressure depending on which to be prioritized.

## CHINA-RUSSIA RELATIONS IN AFRICA

Many countries have substantial economic, political and military influence in Africa. For China, Africa has relatively been an easy ground in terms of diplomacy and has not caused a major conflict with any other major player. Russia in the last decade has also been one of those major players. China and Russia seem to be following their own agendas and, despite differences in their approaches in Africa, the two countries support each other in the UN. Analysts must be able to analyze implications of Russia-China cooperation and competition, which will likely have an impact on NATO member and partner countries.

## CHINESE STRATEGY AND LINES OF EFFORT IN AFRICA

Considering the proportion of economic activities in Africa to China's global economic footprint, and given the low priority of Africa within China's overall strategic planning, some experts argue that China's activities in Africa are given "disproportionate level of international attention". Analysts must be able to recognize the difference between Chinese words and deeds, and understand China's true intentions in Africa, and their importance and relevance in broader foreign policies.



Africa, being more of a means rather than an end for Chinese strategic planning, must be considered as another geopolitical arena to monitor Chinese foreign-relations practices; providing insight on its practices in more strategic geographies. Therefore, it is important for analysts to monitor all spheres of Chinese presence in Africa and understand its global implications on NATO members and partner countries.

China's approach in Africa in diplomatic, information, economic and military (DIME) spheres are as follows:

#### **Diplomatic**

- The desired end state for diplomacy has been to receive African countries' political support in the United Nations for pursuing its own near-abroad political agenda (African nations constitute the largest voting bloc in the United Nations). The main objective so far has been to become African countries "partner of choice", and gain leadership role in shaping Africa's future. In order to achieve that, China's officials have been developing close relationship with top local authorities for years, providing political support for authoritarian regimes, giving out developmental aid since the mid-20th century, conducting high-level visits and summits and, in the last year, providing COVID-19 support.
- Africa has been a means for China to exercise grand, strategic level diplomacy, and is an easy ground in terms of foreign relations without conflict and too many resources invested.
- Recognition of "One China" concept is stated as the fundamental for building relations with African countries.
- Open to state-to-state dialogue with countries that have not yet established ties with China.
- China, pursuing active diplomacy, currently has 52 embassies and 5 consulate generals (24 percent increase since 2013).

#### **Information**

- Africa's 1.3 billion population is expected to reach 2.1 billion by 2040, passing some of mostly populated countries like India and China. Africa's consumer base, technology consumption, and media reach are likewise expected to grow enormously, while consumers leapfrog landline infrastructure and jump straight to digital mobile technology. The population growth is expected to be led by middle class and therefore, media is and will continue to be important to successfully and sustainably penetrate into the continent.
- Currently, China's media approach in Africa, has been to actively push positive aspects of China's involvement in Africa rather than report and cover local matters for local citizens. Consequently, Chinese media reception and coverage are reported to be

substantially limited compared to those of American, British and French media. Currently, despite rising concerns on becoming too dependent on China, and the negative impact of Chinese investments in society and environment, China is still perceived as “the second best model for development” after the U.S. in Africa.

- China's main desired end state has been to enhance its image worldwide and spread the “Chinese way of development” model across developing countries. In doing so, China has been investing on media capabilities to develop Chinese soft power and counter rising anti-Chinese sentiment across the African Continent. China, in order to achieve those objectives, is establishing media outlets, promoting African students to study in China and contributing to U.N. missions in Africa.

### **Economic**

- China's economic sphere in Africa has two desired main objectives: 1) to diversify and increase trade and 2) to diversify hydrocarbon imports and have access to critical natural resources. The core objective for China therefore is to maximize return on investments in Africa, which in turn is expected to contribute to Chinese soft power development in Africa. China gives out loans and aids which in turn are spent on financing infrastructure contracts, of which most are obtained by Chinese companies.

### **Military**

- Chinese military presence in Africa, in parallel to its longstanding adherence to non-interference policy, has so far mainly been to secure its economic interests and protect Chinese citizens in Africa (Over 180,000 working and total 1 million people living). In recent years though, China is observed to be increasing military activity and providing comprehensive support to African countries in counter-terrorism and piracy by conducting regional military exercises, training local armed forces, selling arms and promoting the employment of its security personnel (illegal for Chinese security personnel to bear arms except under certain conditions). Further developments in its military presence will indicate a major change in its historical approach.
- As of Feb 2020, China has over 2,000 troops in African missions and has become the largest troop contributor and second largest financier of the U.N.
- China's desired end state in the military sphere is to provide sustainable security for its investments and land / maritime trade.
- China's main objective has thus been to secure economic entities and protect working Chinese citizens on and around the continent. Security is important and will become even more important as 84 percent of Chinese investments were reported to be in medium to high-risk African countries.
- China is one of the top arms exporters to Africa. Another objective therefore is has been to develop markets for its arms industry. Between 2000 and 2019, Africa in total accounted for 20 percent of China's arms exports while China accounted only for 8 percent of Africa's arms imports (falling to 3 percent in 2019). At the same time, Africa accounted for 16 percent in Russia's arms exports while Russia took 37 percent (increasing in the last years to reach 52 percent). Briefly, Russia is more important to Africa than China; however, Africa is more important for China than to Russia.
- On the other hand, Russia and China's arms sales have been asymmetrical in the African market. This is critical in understanding areas of influence since arms sales usually accompany political agenda. While North Africa is dominated by Russia where China has very small share in arms sales, Sub-Saharan Africa is subject to larger and varying competition between the two players.

### **Challenges for China in Africa**

Below are some of the key issues that have already created or will most likely create challenges for China in Africa.

- The public perception on lack of sufficient social and climate concerns with Chinese economic activity in Africa, and public discontent towards the results so far achieved in China's impact on African development.
- Increasing concerns of governing elites about Chinese reliance on investments and external debt.
- Increasing indebtedness and deteriorating GDPs of African countries that might hamper BRI and return on investments.

These challenges are least likely to change China's overall strategy in Africa, but may slow down level of activity and progress.

### **Conclusion**

Despite China's increased level of activity in the continent, African countries still make up a relatively small part of China's global economic activity and the continent still has low priority in China's strategic planning. However, China will most likely maintain its approach of using financial support, trade, foreign direct investments and health diplomacy to penetrate Africa, increase its influence, and further its economic interests.

It is important for analysts to monitor all spheres of Chinese presence in Africa, and understand its global implications on NATO members and partner countries. **LC**



## LANDCOM MISSION

LANDCOM is the Theatre Land Component and Land Advocate responsible for coordinating and synchronizing NATO and Partner Land Forces by enabling land domain READINESS, INTEROPERABILITY, STANDARDIZATION, and COMPETENCY; stands ready to deploy headquarters elements to provide planning, coordination, and C2 capabilities to Allied forces. LANDCOM will retain the capability to perform the role of MC-LCC as long as it is required, even on a permanent basis if the decision is made.



**MND-N**

ADAZI, LVA  
MARCH - 2019



**MGEN FLEMMING MATHIASSEN**



**MND-NE**

ELBLAG, POL  
JULY - 2017



**MGEN KRZYSZTOF MOTACKI**



**XXX**

**MNC-NE**



SZCZECIN, POL  
SEPTEMBER - 2018



**LGEN SŁAWOMIR WOJCIECHOWSKI**



**XXX**

**ARRC**



INNSWORTH, GBR  
JULY - 2019



**LGEN EDWARD SMYTH-OSBOURNE**



**XXX**

**1 GNC**



MUNSTER, GER  
FEBRUARY - 2020



**LGEN ANDREAS MARLOW**



**XXX**

**RRC-FR**



LILLE, FRA  
AUGUST - 2019



**LGEN PIERRE GILLET**



**XXX**

**EUROCORPS**



STRASBOURG, FRA  
SEPTEMBER - 2019



**LGEN LAURENT KOLODZIEJ**



**XXX**

**NRDC-ITA**



SOLBIATE, ITA  
DECEMBER - 2019



**LGEN GUGLIELMO L. MIGLIETTA**



**XXX**

**NRDC-SP**



VALENCIA, ESP  
JANUARY - 2020



**LGEN FERNANDO GARCÍA-VAQUERO**



# LAND COMMAND



## STRATEGIC, JOINT & SINGLE SERVICE COMMANDS



SHAPE

**GEN WOLTERS**  
MAY - 2019



JFCBS

**GEN VOLLMER**  
APR - 2020



JFCNP

**ADM BURKE**  
JUL - 2020



JFCNF

**VADM LEWIS**  
DEC - 2018



LANDCOM

**LGEN CLOUTIER**  
AUG - 2020



AIRCOM

**GEN HARRIGIAN**  
MAY - 2019



MARCOM

**VADM BLOUNT**  
MAY - 2019



NSHQ

**BGEN STEPHENSON**  
JAN - 2021



XXX

**MNC-SE**

BUCHAREST, ROU  
FEBRUARY - 2020

**LGEN TOMITA-CATALIN TOMESCU**

## NATO Force Integration Units



XX

**MND-SE**

BUCHAREST, ROU  
JUNE - 2020

**BGEN CRISTIAN DAN**



XXX

**NRDC-TUR**

ISTANBUL, TUR  
AUGUST - 2018

**LGEN KEMAL YENI**



XXX

**NRDC-GR**

THESSALONIKI, GRE  
MARCH - 2021

**LGEN ANASTASIOS SPANOS**



XXX

**LANDCOM**

IZMIR, TUR  
AUGUST - 2020

**LGEN ROGER L. CLOUTIER JR.**



**BULGARY**

**UKRAINE**

**RUSSIA**

**ROMANIA**

**GEORGIA**

**TURKEY**

# NATO & BLACK SEA SECURITY

*By Liam A.B. Patrick and US Army Lieutenant Colonel Michael B. Patrick, LANDCOM G5*

**T**here is very little agreement on the definition of 'security' no matter the level at which the term is applied. This is due to the multiple, perhaps innumerable, variables that can be applied to the concept and, accordingly, an inability to achieve consensus of definition. It is intuitive that security implies an absence of, or reasonable ability to counter, threat. However, the qualification of what is threatening and what is threatened is equally challenging. Even more elusive is consensus in creating an 'absence of threat' which could achieve the security sought. It is for such reasons that discussing subsets, such as physical or economic security, is often preferred.

Applying this less-than-precise idea to the Black Sea Region is very challenging due to the region's unique nature. The Black Sea itself is an internationally shared resource surrounded by a limited number of heterogeneous nations who view this resource in fundamentally different ways. In this regard, access to and exploitation of the Black Sea has wide-reaching security implications for each nation. However, depending upon the nation discussed, the breadth and depth of the security implications vary from existential (if the resource itself is viewed as a requirement to overarching security) to something more akin to economic (if the resource either requires security to exploit or enables an aspect or a limited subset of security). Russia's view of the Black Sea aligns with the former and is multi-faceted; the Black Sea is, simultaneously, a source of economic wealth, an enabler to economic growth and leverage, a strategic gateway to the Mediterranean and beyond, and a buffer to out-of-region instability.

To put it simply, the resolution to an international issue arising from sharing a resource follows one of three principles: dominance (control by a single entity), reciprocity (an arrangement which mandates collective behaviour and punishes infractions) or identity (the sharing of common interests based upon identification within a group). Historically, the principle of dominance has been favoured by Russia while reciprocity has more recently ensured that sufficient security existed. Presently, however, a lack of regional security is perceived, and NATO is sought to ameliorate this issue.

This paper briefly examines the history of the Black Sea Region; outlining the interplay of dominance and reciprocity pertinent to regional security. It further assesses the current security situation and argues, while NATO has taken actions that have increased the relative level of security of its member and partner nations residing within the Black Sea Region, overall regional security remains elusive. It concludes by noting the advocacy for Alliance creation or imposition of Black Sea security requires both coherence in approach, and cognizance of limitations.

## RUSSIAN REGIONAL DOMINANCE

Russian imperial expansion southward into the region began as early as 1637, under Tsar Mihal Romanov, and advanced with mixed success until the 18th Century wherein the security associated with an expanded empire, including assured access to warm-water ports and beyond, became the Russian goal. Between 1768 and 1774, the protracted conflict between Russia and the Ottoman Empire (1768-1774) saw the former gain access to the region via the ports of Kerch and Azov. Nine

years later, in 1783, Russia annexed Crimea and founded the city of Sevastopol. The Crimean War (1853-1856), effectively engaging four empires, saw Russia's ambition to gain control to the Black Sea though the capture of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles (Turkish Straits) thwarted, albeit only temporarily. Indeed, the desire to gain control of the strategic passage is cited as one of the underlying reasons for Russia's entry into the First World War. Ultimately the closure of the straits by the Ottomans and Germans and its severe impact upon Russia's economy, again, denied both the Russian Empire's strategic ambition and, arguably, directly contributed to its collapse in 1917.



In the post World War I period, the treaties of Sevres (1920) and Lausanne (1923) attempted to redefine the region's geography with mixed results. Notably, the Treaty of Lausanne, which established the basis for the Republic of Turkey, was a catalyst to reciprocity and security insofar as it moderated European tensions in the region and was leveraged to establish the Montreux Convention (1936). This convention firmly established Turkish control over the straits, guaranteed free passage to the military ships of Black Sea states not in conflict with Turkey, and limited access to the warships of non-Black Sea States. The convention was contested by the Soviet Union in what is now known as the 1946 Turkish Straits Crisis; an action that spurred both the US Doctrine of Containment and the admission of Turkey into the NATO Alliance in 1952. Throughout the Cold War, while the Black Sea Region can generally be characterized as

having endured a period of super-power-imposed peace, it was, nonetheless, largely within the sphere of soviet influence. Among the six littoral states, only Turkey existed as a Western democratic ally and partner.

### ATTEMPTS TO REGAIN DOMINANCE

The fall of the Soviet Union (1989-1991) brought drastic change to the Region. Bulgaria and Romania successfully joined the NATO Alliance in 2004 and the European Union in 2007. Georgia, gaining its independence in 1991 and reoriented westward; joining the North Atlantic Cooperation Council the following year, the Partnership for Peace in 1994, and during the 2008 Bucharest Summit, was assured of its membership once reform measures were implemented. Ukraine, similarly, joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1991 and the Partnership for Peace in 1994. In 1997, with the signing of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, the NATO-Ukraine Commission was created with a view to enabling reforms commensurate with Ukraine's ambition to achieve membership within the Alliance.

Cumulatively and definitively, by the middle of the first decade of the 21st Century, Russia had been stripped of the preceding three centuries of security and economic gains within the region; finding itself as the sole state outside of NATO membership or partnership. The effective loss of its (partial) regional dominance and its belief that reciprocity could not assure its needs, led to the perception of endangerment of its wider security and, therefore, represented a risk which required active mitigation.





Under the power of Vladimir Putin and with the stabilization of its economy, Russian expansionism in the Black Sea Region was renewed. In 2008, having perhaps learned from the international community's lack of response to the 1991 separation, and subsequent occupation by Russia of the Moldovan territory of Transnistria, and on the heels of NATO's pronouncement of its intent to accept Georgia into the Alliance, Russia invaded and occupied the Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Osetia. In a similar vein, in 2014 following the ouster of President Yanukovich for his rejection of greater European economic ties and subsequent suppression of popular dissent (and again without meaningful international reaction), Russia invaded and annexed Crimea and fomented the succession of the Ukrainian provinces of Donetsk and Lugansk. These combined actions served to substantially increase Russia's control over portions of the region both on land and sea, thereby increasing its level of security, be it real or perceived. Clearly, this has created a direct loss of security in all respects to NATO partners Georgia and Ukraine, and an indirect loss to NATO member states within the region.

Specific to future Russian intent, there is a clear, overarching goal of solidifying gains at least in their present state; practically translating to the physical retention of Crimea in perpetuity, and the maintenance of direct influence over the 'autonomous regions' of Abkhazia, South Osetia, Donetsk and Lugansk. In other words, international acceptance of the status quo. However, it is possible that the status quo is insufficient to Russia's perceived security and political needs or desires. Militarily, while wholesale breaches of sovereignty present significant risk, it is conceivable that Russia could continue its offensive in Ukraine with a view to create land access to Crimea and alleviating the choke point formed by the Kerch Strait. Such an action would give Russia complete ownership of the Sea of Azov, thereby affording greater security to this sea, the Caspian Sea, and the strategically important (but vulnerable) Volga-Don Canal which connects the two. Politically and economically, it is assured that Russia will continue to expand its fossil fuel marketing throughout the region with the dual purpose

of bolstering the Russian economy while creating a market dependency that can be leveraged in a number of ways. Beyond this, there is no reason to believe that Russia's playbook of malign activities in the region such as cyber attacks, psychological and information warfare, and use of proxies will be closed. It can be hypothesized that Russia's desire for regional dominance has not abated, only its methods of achieving regional 'unipolarity' have changed.

### **NATO'S RESPONSE**

NATO's intent to meaningfully counter Russian expansionism

and thereby increase Black Sea security was initiated at the 2014 Wales Summit, built upon in successive summits, and has seen an uptick in both quantity and quality of NATO capabilities generally, and in the Black Sea Region specifically. Collectively known as the Readiness Action Plan (RAP), distinct activities were, and continue to be, characterized as either Assurance Measures (the presence of Alliance military capabilities aimed at both assuring NATO members and their populations, and deterring threat), or Adaptation Measures (changes to Alliance structure and capabilities aimed at increasing responsiveness and effectiveness).

Assurance Measures are tailored to the region and/or allied nation at hand, and are intended to provide a meaningful effect through presence, increased capability and/or coverage of a gap in capability. For example, in 2015, NATO and



Turkey implemented a package of measures, collectively known as Tailored Assurance Measures for Turkey (TAMT), which included increased airborne warning, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and information sharing, among others. Additionally, NATO's Tailored Forward Presence (tFP), an initiative aimed at demonstrating the Alliance's commitment to the Black Sea Region, was announced following the 2016 Warsaw Summit. This multi-faceted package spans the land, maritime and air domains and includes, inter alia, the establishment of Multi-National Brigade South-East in Romania, increased regional maritime activity, air policing, and the provision of ballistic missile defence.

With respect to Adaptation Measures directly impacting the region, several aspects bear mentioning. The creation of NATO Force Integration Units, specifically in Romania and Bulgaria, meaningfully facilitate NATO's rapid ingress to the region in times of crises. Noted by NATO: "[these] small units represent a visible and persistent NATO presence...The primary mission of NFIUs is to foster collaboration between national forces and the NATO High Readiness Forces in times of military-political crises."

Although the NATO High Readiness Force was officially initiated in 2002 via the Prague Summit and underwent adjustments to



its composition and manning between its establishment in 2006 and the 2014 Wales Summit, this summit marked a significant change to this organization through the conceptualization of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) which subsequently achieved its planned capability in 2016. The VJTF, comprising significant multi-national land, maritime, air, and special operations formations, as well as commensurate domain-specific and joint C2, is capable of deploying at short notice and achieving effects within days. Beyond its value as a 'force in being', the VJTF deploys to exercise its capabilities annually and, thus, provides visible and credible assurance and deterrence within the Black Sea Region and elsewhere. The value, with respect to increasing Alliance interoperability, of regularly forming, training and deploying such an entity should also be noted.

Finally, the Alliance has and continues to increase its standing C2 capability and capacity within the Black Sea Region. In December of 2015, HQ Multinational Division South-East was officially established and reached its intended operational capability in 2018. NATO's regional C2 will further increase in the near future with the creation of HQ Multinational Corps South-East. This HQ, authorized by the Romanian Parliament in 2020, is intended to "...contribute to the strengthening of the defence and deterrence posture of NATO's Eastern Flank and will offer coherence to the C2 chain at [the] regional level". Effectively, once this HQ achieves its full operational capability, NATO's South-East Region will have a unified NATO C2 spanning the Corps to the Brigade level.

Partner nations within the region have also seen increased support from the Alliance. The 2014 Wales Summit launched The Substantial NATO-Georgia Package aimed at defense capacity building. NATO has similarly provided its support



# THE ENHANCED NATO RESPONSE FORCE (NRF)

Debating  
Europe  
www.debatingeurope.eu



IN 2014 NATO ALLIES AGREED TO  
**ENHANCE THE NRF**  
TO RESPOND TO EMERGING  
SECURITY CHALLENGES  
FROM RUSSIA, THE MIDDLE EAST  
AND NORTH AFRICA



THE NRF WILL CONSIST OF  
**30,000 TROOPS**  
DEPLOYABLE WORLDWIDE  
WITHIN 5-30 DAYS



**5,000 TROOPS**  
WILL FORM THE CORE OF A  
**VERY HIGH READINESS  
JOINT TASK FORCE (VJTF)**  
DEPLOYABLE WITHIN  
48 TO 72 HOURS



TROOPS FOR THE NRF 2015  
ARE PROVIDED BY GERMANY,  
THE NETHERLANDS, NORWAY  
AND OTHERS



MARITIME AND AIR ELEMENTS  
WILL BE PROVIDED BY  
(AMONG OTHERS)  
THE UNITED KINGDOM,  
FRANCE, SPAIN, AND BELGIUM



SPAIN WILL BE THE FIRST LEAD  
NATION OF THE VJTF IN 2016 AND  
THE UNITED KINGDOM WILL LEAD  
IN 2017

THEN FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY,  
POLAND, SPAIN AND THE UNITED  
KINGDOM WILL TAKE TURNS TO  
LEAD THE VJTF



RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF THE VJTF  
WILL BE FACILITATED BY SMALL  
COMMAND AND CONTROL AND  
RECEPTION FACILITIES CALLED  
NATO FORCE INTEGRATION UNITS  
(NFIU)

to Ukraine and both states currently benefit from heightened levels of interaction, training and exercises. Taken in total, Alliance initiatives have seen increases to individual member and partner nations' security and, by extension, Alliance security has collectively benefited.

Notwithstanding NATO actions, post-2014 events such as the November 2018 Russian seizure of Ukrainian ships in the Sea of Asov, or the more recent aggressive actions toward HMS Defender off the coast of Crimea in June of 2021, have shown Black Sea regional security remains turbulent, and NATO is being urged to do more. However, any expectation that NATO can create or impose overarching security in the Black Sea Region may be misplaced. In fact, the Alliance is challenged even in extending security subsets, including military security, within the region for a number of key reasons.

Primarily, as an alliance, NATO is not monolithic and its reliance upon consensus means that any member nation, regional or otherwise, can directly influence actions. In other words, it can not regionally act like a state and is ill advised to do so, be it through principles of dominance or reciprocity, for fear of fracturing the Alliance. No matter the perception of the region's importance, or its perceived lack of security, there is very little likelihood that, for example, nations reliant upon Russian commodities will support Alliance actions that may jeopardize access.

Additionally, assuming consensus can be achieved, the practical implementation of any NATO initiative is down to member nations and, thus, envisioned effects supporting Black Sea security are often met with friction of practical implementation. It is for such reasons that the aforementioned Multinational Brigade South-East, having only modest participation from other nations, remains largely a Romanian brigade under NATO flag. The cost of NATO's enhanced C2 in the South-East of its area of responsibility is being footed, for the most part, by a single nation (Romania), and no NATO permanent Black Sea maritime force has materialized despite prolonged discussion and its obvious merit.

Finally, NATO is challenged by its ability to directly effect the non-military (even if militarized) tools that Russia's hybrid approach utilizes. While Alliance expertise exists, it is largely confined to advisory roles and delivered upon request. Moreover, in line with NATO's *raison d'être*, its approach to counter-hybrid is defensive in nature and, therefore, reactive. Perhaps most importantly, in the application of effects, both the Alliance and its constituent members are confined both by the rule of law and international norms; neither of which are viewed as constraints by Russia.

Given the above, it is little wonder that Alliance activities aimed at increasing security within the Black Sea Region appear ad hoc and subject to criticism. "Does NATO have a scheme of security for the Black Sea or, for that matter, a strategy? No, it does not. What NATO has...is a set of deterrence and adaptation measures for the Alliance, a Tailored Forward Presence in its south-eastern region and 'appropriate measures' in the Black Sea region to provide, amongst other things, 'peacetime demonstration of NATO's intent to operate without constraint'." Plainly speaking then, if Black Sea security, vice individual member state security, is the goal, and if NATO is desired to be a major contributor, then the Alliance writ large must agree both to a strategy and the means to implement it.

### **Conclusion – Key Elements of NATO Black Sea Regional Strategy**

The aim of NATO's Black Sea Regional Strategy should be, inter alia, to actively dissuade Russia of the notion that Black Sea Region dominance is possible and, through comprehensive action, force acceptance of reciprocity in the access to, and management of, the Region's chief resource. This implies that both the Alliance and its member states must be collectively and individually active in this dissuasion. Moreover, the unified approach of the Alliance and of its individual members must leverage, to the same effect, other regionally relevant international organizations. While regional member nations will need to closely examine their respective vulnerabilities and security needs, within the prevue of the Alliance, the key elements of the strategy must encompass all military domains and should specifically and coherently consider:

- The defensive sufficiency of member nations within the Black Sea Region
- The sufficiency of NATO collective capabilities within the Black Sea Region
- The establishment of a permanent maritime presence
- The establishment of a permanent air presence
- Continued investment in the Alliance's extant regionally applicable initiatives
- Continued support to the advancement of Partners' defence capacity and capability with a view to their acceptance within the Alliance
- Continued enhancement of counter-hybrid expertise
- An active and focused training and joint exercise 'campaign'
- An active and focused supporting information campaign. **LC**



# STANDARDISING LAND COMMUNICATION & INFORMATION SYSTEMS


By NIC A-2 Tuğrul ŞENGİZER LANDCOM G6, CIS Interoperability Analyst

On 26 and 27 May 2021, NATO Allied Land Command conducted its annual Land Forces G6 conference, which brought together a multidisciplinary team of experts from the NATO Forces Structure (NFS) - foremost the Graduated Response Forces Land (GRF(L)) - and NATO Command agencies to share and discuss lessons identified and learned in regards to the interoperability of Land Communication and Information Systems (CIS).

One of the key topics was the orienting participants to the burgeoning Federated Mission Network.

## THE FEDERATED MISSION NETWORK (FMN) AS CORNERSTONE FOR CIS STANDARDISATION

Standardisation is an integral part of our daily lives. We pump petrol in our cars with standardised refueling pumps. The communications connectivity in our homes and whilst we are mobile is made possible through equipment and infrastructure that is developed to be compliant with international standards. We expect that standardisation in order to make our lives more predictable. In the military, we also rely on communications that are standardised in our nations. For NATO, Federated Mission



# Federated Mission Networking

Networking exists to facilitate NATO and partner forces in a mission environment, to improve command and control and information sharing. As FMN is to be operationally driven and technologically supported, the involvement of the operational community, like LANDCOM, is essential.

FMN has its roots in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan where there was a need to create a more agile "network" of forces to be more operationally effective. The Afghanistan mission network (AMN) was created by eliminating sufficient number of barriers between Coalition Forces information networks to improve communications and interaction. Years later, FMN seeks to create these interoperable networks on Day 1 of an operation. However, interoperability is not a static "state" and requires significant effort to maintain and improve over time. The FMN Framework is the working structure that creates spiral specifications, both procedural and technical services, which mandate changes every two years. It is important to understand that these specifications provide the standardised ways of working and information exchange whilst in an operation with other nations and partner forces. FMN currently has 35 affiliates that are composed of staff from NATO nations and partners who are working together to develop common goals per spiral and then have the task of going back to their capability delivery organisations to then achieve them in four years' time. NCS is one of the affiliates working within ACO, including LANDCOM,

Specification under development is Spiral 5 that is due to be in force 2026-2027. Spiral specifications are developed across a number of operational areas, or Swimlanes, by a group of "syndicates" or working groups. The figure below provides a graphical representation of the expected changes by spiral across a number of the current Swimlanes described by their

Swimlanes (so called operational areas)	Spiral 1	Spiral 2	Spiral 3	Spiral 4	Spiral 5	Spiral 6	Spiral 7
* Operational use Timeframes *			2022-2023	2024-2025	2026-2027	2028-2029	2030-2031
Federated Air Command and Control and Battlespace Management							
Federated Civil-Military Cooperation							
Federated Cyberspace Command and Control							
Federated Force Protection							
Federated Geospatial Capabilities							
Federated Intelligence							
Federated Joint Command and Control and Battlespace Management							
Federated Joint Fires							
Federated Joint Targeting							
Federated Land Command and Control and Battlespace Management							
Federated Logistic Support							
Federated Medical Support							
Federated CIS Security							
Federated Communications							
Federated Distributed Collaboration							
Federated Information Management							
Federated Service Management and Control							

titles in the figure.

Figure 2: Swimlane Related Improvements to Interoperability by Spiral

For example, the Land Command and Control and Battlespace Management Swimlane is developing specifications that will improve the ability of operational and tactical level forces information exchange. Those improvements will be fielded in time to be available from 2021-2027. Note that those changes are delivered by each successive Spiral from 2 – 5. The Spirals 2 – 4 are already approved Spirals. However, there is still time for staff from associated units to participate in the development of the Spiral 5 Specifications. There is also an opportunity for involvement in the development of the Spiral Specification Roadmap 2022. The Interworking Group Syndicates for Command and Control, Force Protection, Joint Targeting and Fires, Logistics and Tactical Edge could be of interest to the Land Community.

This short article was to provide a simple understanding of FMN as it supports and affects the operational community. Also, this article is intended to illuminate the opportunity for the operational community to get involved in the FMN Framework to define the future Land Command and Control needs. The interoperability of forces is best created before an operation begins; providing a more robust force in a short amount of time. The Federated Mission Networking initiative enables rapid

connectivity of forces. The operational community need to drive FMN in order for the forces to operate in an interoperable fashion; resulting in greater mission effectiveness. **LC**

For further information, please contact Mr. Tuğrul Şengezer, Tugrul.Sengezer@lc.nato.int or Mr. Warren Low, warren.low@act.nato.int.




Figure 1: FMN's Incremental Approach to Improving Interoperability

A 10 Year Spiral Specification Roadmap is developed to define the objectives and capability enhancements that are agreed by all 35 affiliates. The aim is to achieve the FMN Vision by creating FMN compliant forces that are synchronised in time by the spiral specifications use dates. For example, the next



2021

# ALLIED LAND COMMAND

## ANNUAL GENDER WEEK

**HQ** LANDCOM, in reference to UNSCR 1325, NATO/ EAPC Policy and Action Plan on WPS and ACO's Strategic Plan, mainstream and integrate the gender perspective into and throughout all tasks, and at all levels through integration, inclusiveness, integrity, monitoring and reporting.

The WPS is fundamental to NATO's common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. In addition to UNSCR 1325 and its related resolutions, the mandate is grounded in International Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law legal framework. The WPS agenda has continued to gain recognition and shape policy and procedures across the alliance.

For LANDCOM, gender equality is a consistent factor in everything the command does, from exercises to planning operations. Using the three principles of integration, inclusiveness and integrity, as well as monitoring and reporting, not only does LANDCOM adhere to NATO policy, it helps set the standard. With active support from leadership, this translates to gender perspectives integrated into the allocation of resources, awareness events, training, the planning, and execution of operations, combat readiness evaluation and the lessons learned processes. To achieve this, LANDCOM engages across the Alliance and across to non-NATO entities such as United Nations, International Committee of the Red Cross and other International Organizations for coordination of information and education.

LANDCOM (LC) Gender Week is an annual event with the aim of raising awareness of the integration and mainstreaming of gender perspectives. This is achieved through workshops for LC Key Leaders and training activities for all staff, including Gender Advisors (GENADs) and Gender Focal Points (GFPs) from across the NATO Force Structure (NFS). It enhances engagement and improves coordination and cooperation with Non NATO entities. The week ends with a welfare and team building event in the form of a sports competition "We run for peace and security".

2021 Annual LANDCOM Gender Week took place from 28 June to 02 July 2021. In accordance with the new NATO Policy on the Sexual Exploitation and Abuse [SEA], Conflict Related Sexual, and Gender Based Violence [CRSGBV], the theme of 2021 Annual LANDCOM Gender Week is "Zero Tolerance for CRSGBV and SEA against women, men, girls and boys".

NATO Secretary General's Special Representative on WPS Ms. Clare Hutchinson, SHAPE VCOS LTG Brice Houdet, UN Under

Secretary General Ms. Pramila Patten, SHAPE GENAD Major Sanja PEJOVIC, All Survivor's Project Executive Director Ms. Charu Lata Hogg, COE Defence Against Terrorism Deputy Director Col Wayne Stone and Academic Advisor Dr. Zeynep Sütalan provided awareness speeches or training sessions for all LANDCOM staff on Integration of Gender Perspectives, CRSGBV and SEA.

The speakers has reiterated NATO's commitment and role on integrating gender perspectives through its three core tasks of Collective Defence, Crisis Management and Cooperative Security. They further exemplified that Women, Peace and Security (WPS) mandate is comprised of four pillars: participation and representation, prevention, protection, relief and recovery for men, women, girls and boys.

LANDCOM Gender week social media campaign through its video and posts was a success in raising awareness on integration of gender perspectives in LANDCOM and the stand on "Zero Tolerance for CRSGBV and SEA against women, men, girls and boys". **LC**

By NIC A-2 AYSEGUL BINALI LANDCOM G9, HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS OFFICER – A/GENAD





# LANDCOM AND USAREUR-AF COMPREHENSIVE TRAINING INITIATIVE: USING EXERCISES IN SUPPORT OF A GROWING INTEGRATION

By Colonel Francois DICKES & Lieutenant-Colonel Adrian Spicer, LANDCOM G-7

*“Sharing information would help  
build relationships  
and the two together would  
kindle a new, coherent  
adaptive entity that could win  
the fight.”*

*GEN Stanley McChrystal, Team of Teams, New Rules of  
Engagement for a Complex World, 2015*

Since the early days of the Cold War, the U.S. Army has been one of the most important non-NCS, non-NFS Land Domain Military entities on NATO ground. The importance of this presence became even truer with the merging of its Europe and Africa commands into a single entity on 20 November 2020. The new command, called US Army Europe and Africa, also known by the acronym USAREUR-AF was turned into a four-star billet under the command of General Christopher Cavoli. With the reassignment to USAREUR-AF of all units previously assigned to U.S. Army

Africa, this new Land command gained in importance and extended its footprint over two continents.

LANDCOM as NATO's advocate for the Land Domain could not ignore such a change and had to enhance an already existing relationship. As a matter of fact, the consolidation of a new U.S. Army command represents a great opportunity to build a multiple theater-wide win-win relationship which would support NATO's 360 degrees approach and which would allow entities from both NATO and USAREUR-AF to learn from each other and mutually support each other in achieving better combat readiness.

## **A GRADUAL AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH**

Mutual knowledge and understanding, shared awareness and purposes are the first step of the process. For years now, the LANDCOM and USAREUR-AF co-chaired Combined Training Conference as well as LANDCOM's G7 conferences have been helping to define common purposes and better coordinate Land domain activities between the U.S. Army and NATO Allies and Partners.

The next step is already ongoing with growing efforts to fostering the relationship through sharing training opportunities and coordinating major exercises. There is a twofold benefit in sharing: in addition to confronting commanders and forces to the challenge of fighting together, training venues including academics and key leader trainings offer opportunities to align doctrine and processes towards better standardization and interoperability. Moreover,



better coordination of high profile, major exercises supports deterrence and widen the common deterrence footprint. Further steps include the linkage of US and NATO exercises as well as the cross-participation of US/NATO Corps and Divisions to each other's exercises. Linkages give better coherence and consistence to the comprehensive exercise picture. The linkage of a LANDCOM sponsored exercise such as LOYAL LEDA with a USAREUR-AF exercise would demonstrate the growing convergence between the two commands. Moreover, with the positioning of U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF) under USAREUR-AF, there is an opportunity to enhance the cross-theater Land footprint by linking USAREUR-AF and NATO exercises. As it is an enabler to better forces integration, cross participation of US and NATO Land entities in each other's exercises should become more regular. Options could include the opening of the LOYAL LEDA exercise cycle to U.S. Corps/Division HQs as training audiences and reciprocity allowing NATO HQs and Units involvement in U.S. Land exercises such as WARFIGHTER.

#### **CREATING A SUSTAINABLE DYNAMIC BETWEEN LEARNING ENTITIES**

In December 2020, commanders of USAREUR-AF, SETAF-AF and U.S. V Corps were invited by COM LANDCOM to Izmir. The purpose of this invitation was to further familiarize one another with their respective capabilities, responsibilities and vision but also trigger a closer alignment of future

exercises and training initiatives. Convergence of positions was confirmed and 2021-2024 was identified as a transition period during which exchanges, trainings and exercises would support the scaling up of headquarters teaming up within a tailored comprehensive training initiative.

The first occurrence of the 2021 Combined Training Conference (CTC 21-01) from 28 June to 2 July was the occasion to further share this initiative and breathe life into it at the staff level. The NATO orientation meeting (NOM) that preceded the core event allowed open exchanges on how to train together, how to train better and how to train specific fields of the warfighting functions.

These exchanges confirmed the dynamic evidenced by the growing involvement of LANDCOM in USAREUR-AF's DYNAMIC FRONT and DEFENDER EUROPE exercises and the involvement of U.S. V Corps in a NATO LEDA exercise for the first time in 2021. Operationalizing their structures to become Warfighting HQs is a priority for both USAREUR-AF (JFLCC) and LANDCOM (MC-LCC). By augmenting each other during exercises both entities create the conditions for mutual support and consciousness. The Team of Teams is building up steadily and the way they stated to learn from each other is encouraging.

#### **FAVORING A RESULT-DRIVEN APPROACH**

Training and exercises are the tool, not the goal. From a practical point of view, NATO exercises make sense as they

give NATO HQs or units a good chance to operate within the framework of a NATO operation and defeat the enemy because they are standardized and interoperable enough to interact with other forces.

LANDCOM has recently developed an Interoperability Campaign Plan that identifies the Priority Focus Areas for interoperability and uses these as Lines of Operations to set out objectives to be achieved to ensure forces are compatible. Concentrating efforts at the divisional and specialist bridge level of command will allow for the maximum impact in the shortest time, but acknowledges that technical interoperability opportunities also exist at a much lower

level. And of course with USAREUR-AF now representing the U.S. Army in 2 continents, the opportunity and return on investment to further enhance interoperability is clear. While the U.S. military is of course greatly involved in the development of NATO STANAGs taking responsibility for a number of doctrine custodian roles, it is on the ground, in the interactions between LANDCOM and USAREUR-AF that we can ensure that this has the maximum impact for the soldier, on combat readiness and in deterrence.

For such a readiness-aimed, interoperability-shaped and exercise-supported relationship to be successful, the LANDCOM USAREUR-AF dynamic should remain result-



driven, not event-driven and supported by a sustainable team work that would resist the usual erosion affecting cross-organizational relationships, mainly:

- misalignment of goals
- lack of communication
- lack of clarity in the definition of roles, responsibilities and decision-making authority

As soon as the working framework is defined and the higher leadership's guidance is being clearly issued, giving staffs ownership of substantial parts of the initiative and

empowering them to execute will be key to success. As decentralized networking will become usual, shared visions, constructive breakthroughs but also more responsible choices will be favored.

Time will test the maturity of the relationship. It is probably a little bit early to talk about integration but the right time to work on convergence. There is still a lot of challenges and hard work ahead: the transformation of a relationship relies on long term commitment and persistent efforts more than it is driven by short term gains and enthusiastic messaging. But where there is a will, there is a way. **LC**



# NATO LAND LOGISTICS CONFERENCE 2021

By British Army Captain Gary MILLEN LPP LANDCOM G4

# In

May, LANDCOM hosted the annual NATO Land Logistics Conference; the rare opportunity for the NATO logistic community to discuss policy changes, strategic considerations, and new direction and guidance for logistic planning across NATO. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the conference had to be conducted by VTC. The conference was held over two days, deconflicting with the low manning priorities set by the pandemic response and allowed for comprehensive discussions and presentations from a dozen guest speakers.

Covering substantial concepts for NATO logistic planning, the guest speakers were able to emphasise the significant points to the 40-50 personnel in attendance from across multiple locations. This ensured a fully holistic understanding and a 'cross brief' to anticipate future timings of target developments.

The first day commenced with a welcoming address by LANDCOM's Assistant Chief of Staff G4, Spanish Army Colonel Jose Moscoso. The first guest speaker from SHAPE provided an update on the status of major work-strands in SHAPE; identifying the new responsibilities and greater clarity to the role of JSEC from SHAPE's perspective. His remarks also included how targets align with the DDA, SASP and SERP. U.S. Army Major Jae Kim from SJLSG PLANS briefed on the Enablement of SACEUR's AOR NRF22 workplan. The NRF assessment process was detailed, with the Question Set methodology demonstrated as proof of the process's effectiveness.

U.S. Army Major Logan Small, LANDCOM plans officer, delivered a summary of the iSASP and SSP-L. The third report on DDA highlighted the clarification of key terms, intent for SJLSG and JSEC and Joint C2 CONOPs revision. This



highlighted the necessary details being developed and set out the road map ahead.

Day two of the conference featured briefings from the Graduated Readiness Forces - Land (GRF-L) Headquarters, covering their sustainment concepts, readiness exercises and preparations for future exercises or roles. British Army Colonel Mike Evanson-Goddard, ARRC ACOS Sustainment, presented a backbrief on the ARRC wargame designed to test the rear area operations during a NATO warfighting scenario.

German Army Lieutenant Colonel Torsten, LANDCOM G4, presented the basics of the Teaming Program with aims to ensure linkages between the NFS and NCS, giving the example of NRDC-GRC Deep Dive Seminar and the ARRC's Road to War TTX. The message taken was that training with realistic Logistics considerations is required to ensure adequate

readiness for all stakeholders, in regards to Information management, C2, Interoperability and HNS.

The two-day NATO Land Logistics Conference made the most of difficult circumstances. With perseverance and enthusiasm, the conference was received well by all participants, demonstrating the fortitude and resourcefulness of the G4 Division in its planning and execution.

Colonel Moscoso summarised his appreciation in his closing remarks: "Although I had hoped that we could have all come together and met in person, I am pleased that this event was successfully conducted by VTC from our respective locations. It has shown we can still operate in trying times, as your professionalism can overcome any challenge. I especially would like to thank the guest speakers for your time and efforts and hope we can all meet again soon". **LC**



# NATO MARKS 60TH ANNIVERSARY OF EUROPEAN AIR PATROLS

RAMSTEIN, Germany - NATO on Thursday, July 1, marked the 60th anniversary of the Alliance's work to keep European skies and territories secure. Since July 1, 1961, Allies have been working together and integrating their Air Defence arrangements and assets to provide coordinated, interlinked and collective Air Defence. This NATO enduring mission continues unabated today and will evolve to meet future security challenges.

For six decades, Air Policing has been an important way for NATO to keep our people safe. This is a clear example of Alliance solidarity in action, demonstrating that NATO has the capabilities and the resolve to protect all Allies

"For six decades, Air Policing has been an important way for NATO to keep our people safe. Across Europe, NATO fighter

jets are on duty around the clock to guard the airspace of our Allies. This is a clear example of Alliance solidarity in action, demonstrating that NATO has the capabilities and the resolve to protect all Allies," said NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. "The pilots and aircrews are doing an important job, and I want to thank them for the dedication and for their professionalism. All Allies owe them a deep level of gratitude. NATO remains vigilant. And as agreed at our recent Summit, we will accelerate innovation and continue to invest in new technologies, to sharpen our technological edge in a more competitive world."

"Over the last 60 years, men and women from air forces across the Alliance have been ready to react 24/7 to defend NATO air space from any and all threats. That has not changed," said the Commander of Allied Air Command, U.S. Air Force General Jeff Harrigian, underscoring the ongoing relevance of the collective Air Policing mission. "Today, in a dynamic and challenging security environment, NATO Air Policing staff from across the Alliance remain vigilant and ready to respond as an agile, multi-



How it started ... control and warning station, air command and control centre and fighter aircraft that NATO used during the 1960s stand for closer Alliance integration and coordination to ensure collective Air Defence in peacetime.

Photo Crown Copyright.

How it's going ... a radar site in Iceland, the Static Air Defence Centre at Combined Air Operations Centre Uedem, Germany, and an Italian Air Force fifth generation fighter aircraft demonstrate how NATO continues to evolve its collective capabilities through innovation by using cutting-edge technology to ensure safe and secure skies for the Allies.

(Photos from up to down: courtesy Icelandic Coast Guard, by Sébastien Raffin, courtesy Italian Air Force)

national team."

General Harrigian's command at Ramstein, Germany, oversees an integrated system of systems involving air command and control centres, air surveillance stations and – most visibly – fighter jets on constant standby across NATO's European territory; ready to safeguard the Allies on behalf of NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

"We have sustained and improved Air Policing for 60 years while welcoming many new members to NATO; committing ourselves to territorial integrity and safety of our airspace and the cause of peace," said U.S. Air Force Major General Phillip Stewart, Deputy Chief of Staff Strategic Employment. "From all of us at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe we say

thank you to all the men and women from across the Alliance for all they have done, and continue to do, to sustain peace."

Moving forward, NATO will continue to evolve its collective capabilities through innovation by using cutting-edge technology further improving situational awareness, exercising multi-domain operations, and integrating fifth generation aircraft. General Harrigian acknowledged the people who have been behind NATO's success story of collective defence for six decades. "As an Airman, I am proud to stand alongside the men and women of all 30 Allied Nations who continue to contribute to the NATO Air Policing mission - thank you."

LC

# ***A STORY OF FRIENDSHIP AND UNDERSTANDING***



**The** Army is the basis of the combat strength of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. They have an important role to play in protecting Ukraine's state sovereignty and territorial integrity in the face of Russian aggression. The basis of the Joint Forces Operation is formed by the Army. But its role is not confined to conducting combat actions. The Army is also responsible for manning of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in general as well as preparing soldiers, non-commissioned officers and commissioned officers for all types and branches of the troops; and work with reserves, and territorial defense. The most important thing is that the Army, its units and elements work most closely and extensively with Ukraine's partners, both individual NATO member states and the NATO Army Command as a whole. Another clear indication of this was the headquarters negotiations between NATO and Ukrainian Army Command that took place in July. The negotiations were headed by NATO Army Commander Lieutenant General Roger CLOUTIER on behalf of NATO and Colonel-General Oleksandr SYRSKYI, the Commander of the Army of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on behalf of Ukraine.

The headquarters negotiations, that took place at the Command of the Army of Ukraine in Kyiv, were preceded by long-term and deep cooperation. Helicopter pilots of the Army, representatives of engineering, motorized and mechanized infantry troops have gained authority at the international level thanks to peacekeeping missions under the auspices of NATO and the UN. Their relationships with foreign partners are based and develop on the principles of mutual respect of people, who understand what professionalism is worth in combat actions.

Opening the joint press conference after the headquarters negotiations in Kyiv, the Commander of The Army of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Colonel-General Oleksandr SYRSKYI, emphasized:

"I would like to express special appreciation to the Commander of NATO's Army, Lieutenant General Roger Cloutier for his stalwart position; for providing us with effective assistance in developing and enhancing our capabilities and compatibility with the Armed Forces of NATO member states."

After all, a friend in need is a friend indeed. Representatives of the Army of Ukrainian Armed Forces appreciated the support of military partners from the NATO member states since the beginning of Russian aggression in 2014. Here are some numbers:

- Training-officers of the Armed Forces of the USA, Canada, the Republic of Lithuania and the Republic of Poland from the Joint Multinational Training Group – Ukraine (JMTG-U) during the period 2015-2021, prepared nine Army of the Ukrainian Armed Forces brigades (five of them – in its totality), four battalion-tactical groups, nine battalions, and one company.
- More than 15,000 servicemen and women of the Army of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have been trained by the training-officers of the Canadian Armed Forces during the UNIFIER mission.



- During the ORBITAL operation, representatives of the British and Denmark Armed Forces trained more than 22 500 Ukrainian servicemen.

These are just a few examples of a serious assistance provided by NATO member states to the Army of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in order to ensure proper training of Ukrainian servicemen for performing combat actions.

Such training covers a variety of spheres such as headquarters work, operational training, intelligence, sniping, electronic warfare, and many others. This is the knowledge and standards that help the Ukrainian servicemen perform combat objectives against the Russian occupier and return home safe and sound.

During the joint press conference, the NATO Allied Land Command commander, Lieutenant General Roger Cloutier, noted "I think constancy is a key factor in any relationship of cooperation. This cooperation is like a muscle: In order to build them, you have to constantly practice."

Behind these words are the years, during which the representatives of the Army of the Ukrainian Armed Forces were improving their interoperability with the representatives of the Armed Forces of NATO member states during peacekeeping operations and multinational exercise. And now they continue to "constantly practice".

For example, this year, representatives of the Army of the Ukrainian Armed Forces took part in a number of multinational exercises involving the Armed Forces of NATO member states. "Cossack Mace – 2021" took place in Ukraine throughout the

month of July in the Mykolayiv region, "Combined Resolve 16" in Germany, "Dynamic Front" in the Republic of Poland, and, of course, "Rapid Trident – 2021" in Ukraine in Lviv region. Army of Ukraine representatives and NATO member states have combined exercises not only to deter aggression, but also to prepare for natural disaster, as during the exercise "Avalanche – 2021" in autumn in the Slovak Republic.

"This is the third time we have met with Colonel-General SYRSKYI since March this year," Lieutenant General Cloutier stated. "For now, we are in a position, when our headquarters have developed a detailed action plan for the next few years."

During his visit in July, Lieutenant General Cloutier and LANDCOM's Command Senior Enlisted Leader Sergeant Major Kevin Mathers paid a visit to the 184th and 169th training centers of the Army of the Armed Forces of Ukraine; observing the organization of the training process and talked to a lot of Ukrainian servicemen. He asked questions of both new recruits and veterans who returned from combat. It was easy for soldiers to find a common ground despite language, place of birth or flag on the sleeve, they live by the same values of a true commander: they know the price of freedom; they know exactly how important it is to complete tasks and save their people.

It goes without saying that further cooperation between LANDCOM and Ukrainian Army will be on the next level. And, surely, this is not just military diplomacy, but, above all, it's a story about friendship and understanding of strong personalities with very similar values. **LC**



# ***PARTNERSHIP BUILDS WITH UKRAINE DURING LAND STAFF TALKS***



***Kyiv***

- Partnership is a two-way street: a mutually beneficial relationship that leverages both entities' abilities to achieve a greater result together. The ever-deepening ties between NATO Allied Land Command and Ukraine's Land Forces is a good example of building that two-way street.

NATO Allied Land Command commander U.S. Army Lieutenant General Roger Cloutier, with his command team and 15 staff members, traveled to Ukraine's Land Forces Headquarters from July 5 - 8, 2021 to conduct Land staff talks in order to deepen cooperation and support with the Enhanced Opportunity Partner.

"These talks will link our staffs closer together," Lieutenant General Cloutier stated during opening remarks to the LANDCOM and Ukraine staff teams. "So, if in the middle of the night you need to pick up the phone to call your friend, you know who that person is, and you've seen them face-to-face."

The first Land Staff Talks with Ukraine coincided with the signing of a Letter of Cooperation in 2018, signifying the intent for a deeper partnership between the two organizations. Ukraine's alignment with NATO dates as far back as the early 90's, and has been a consistent and robust partner to the NATO Alliance; contributing forces to NATO-

led exercises, operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo (to name a few), and the NATO Response Force. The second iterations of talks were originally scheduled for spring of 2020, but travel restrictions due to COVID-19 postponed the event no less than three times.

Breaking into staff sections representing both forces, these syndicates worked to understand similarities and differences between the two organizations to bring Ukraine closer to NATO standards, and by consequence, making the country a more interoperable partner. From Intelligence to Civilian-Military Cooperation, the whole spectrum of staff work was represented and engaged with the goal of building an action plan for future, more technically specific, activities.

"This time with my Ukrainian counterpart was essential to understand their engineer tasks and capabilities," said U.S. Army Major Donald Verpoorten, LANDCOM's general engineering plans officer. "Addressing their most pressing issue, the IED threat in the Donbass and Luhansk regions, we are working together to develop an MTT program to better posture Ukrainian soldiers on the ground against explosive threats."

The next morning, the syndicates reconvened in the auditorium to deliver the results of their time together, and present courses of action tailored to improve capability at the section level. Some actions included additional visits for Ukraine Land Forces Headquarters by a Mobile Training Team, internships at LANDCOM headquarters, and consistent communication.

"The Staff Talks were really eye opening," said US Army Major Kiona Zappe, LANDCOM's Cross Cutting Topics Officer. "Colonel Russian Miroshnichenko and his all-female staff laid out Ukraine's civilian-military efforts on the front lines, and it's very innovative and impressive. I'm happy to see young, bright female officers making a difference in their Army for their country."

As LANDCOM's staff syndicate returned to Turkey, Lt. Gen. Cloutier and CSEL Mathers, not missing the extended their visit to get out of the office and observe tactical training of Ukrainian Land Forces, and meet the US Army Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine currently manned by Task Force Raven, 81st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, Washington National Guard. Through observing training events designed to improve trench warfare, sniper, wet gap crossing, and urban operations, LANDCOM's command team had a better sense of the capabilities of the Ukrainian soldier who are openly engaged in hostilities by Russian forces.

Ukraine's combat experience is a critical component of the LANDCOM-Ukraine partnership. While LANDCOM presents the NATO standard, Ukraine Land Forces' leadership is able to share their procedures honed from combatting Russian aggression. The latest round of Land Staff Talks were just the latest example of the two-way street growing stronger. **LC**



***"These talks will link our staffs closer together."***

***"So, if in the middle of the night you need to pick up the phone to call your friend, you know who that person is, and you've seen them face-to-face."***







# STEADFAST DEFENDER 21 EXERCISE

Romania – Exercise Steadfast Defender 2021, NATO's largest joint multinational training exercise of 2021, took place from May to June in Romania, and involved more than 9,000 participants, nearly 650 pieces of equipment, and contributions from more than 20 NATO member states.

"The exercise allows us to show the value of Allies working together," said U.S. Navy Admiral Robert Burke, Joint Force Command Naples commander, "This exercise also confirms that our NATO Response Forces are trained, skilled, and are able to respond to any threat at any time from any direction."

Steadfast Defender 2021 had three main parts focused on improving interoperability of Allied forces and practicing military mobility throughout Europe.

The first part of the exercise was reinforcement by sea. It focused on improving NATO's ability to protect and defend the Atlantic Ocean and specifically the strategic lines of communication, which enable transatlantic reinforcement by North American allies.

20 ships, a submarine, and 60 aircraft participated off the coast of Portugal. It included the United Kingdom's HMS Queen Elizabeth.

"Working together and coordinating efforts in a synergistic way is a force multiplier and contributes decisively to show NATO

strength and increase its deterrence and posture," said Rear Spanish Navy Admiral Manuel Aguirre Aldereguía, commander of Standing NATO Maritime Group 2.

The second part of the exercise was reinforcement by land. It was a command post exercise focused on enabling a safe and secure transit of military forces through Allied nations.

"My team has done an excellent job," said German Air Force Lieutenant General Jürgen Knappe, Joint Support and Enabling Command Commander. "We were able to experience many valuable insights and managed challenging situations in every single branch."

The final part of the exercise was a regular deployment called Noble Jump. It tested NATO's rapid reaction forces and involved the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF).

"Being the core of VJTF, the 66th Mechanized Infantry Brigade with its Allied elements, trained and motivated personnel and state-of-the-art weapon systems is mission ready for any task given by NATO," said the VJTF 2021 commander, Turkish Army Brigade Colonel Erdoğan Koçoğlu.

Steadfast Defender 2021 was NATO's largest multi-domain exercise of the year; designed to test strategic reinforcement across the Atlantic Ocean, our forces' mobility across European nations, and the VJTF's rapid reaction capabilities. **LC**



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